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INTRODUCTION

In the debate over how federal courts should interpret federal
statutes, "faithful agent" theories stand pitted against "dynamic"
theories of statutory interpretation. The following questions lie at the
heart of the debate: Is the proper role of federal courts to strive to
implement the commands of the legislature-in other words, to act as
Congress's faithful agents? Or, is the proper role of federal courts to
act as partners with Congress in the forward-looking making of
federal law-in other words, to interpret statutes dynamically?
Proponents of faithful agent theories include both "textualists" and
"purposivists." Textualists have argued that federal courts best fulfill
their responsibility to serve as faithful agents of Congress by
interpreting statutes according to the meaning that their texts most
reasonably impart.1 Certain purposivists have argued that federal
courts best fulfill their responsibility to act as faithful agents of
Congress by interpreting statutes according to statutory purposes,
even where those purposes might contradict the most reasonable
import of statutory text. 2 Proponents of dynamic theories of statutory
interpretation reject the premise that federal courts should strive to
act as faithful agents of Congress. Dynamicists cast federal courts as

1.

See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 16-25 (1997) (arguing that

textualism is the means by which judges should determine 'objectified' intent-the intent that a
reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the
corpus juris"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLLY 61, 63 (1994) (arguing that textualism best enables judges to serve as
faithful agents of legislatures).
2.
See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARv. L. REV. 616, 626
(1949) ("The correction of obvious legislative errors or oversights is not to supplant the legislative
will, but to make that will effective.").
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"cooperative partners" with Congress in the federal lawmaking
3
enterprise, rather than as Congress's agents.
Scholars have debated the constitutional legitimacy of these
interpretive theories in separation of powers terms: Which
interpretive methodology best comports with the federal "judicial
power" of Article III 4 relative to the federal "legislative powers" of
Article I?5 Most notably, Professors William Eskridge and John
Manning have debated whether, as a matter of original
understandings of the constitutional structure, the Article III "judicial
power" of federal courts is a power to interpret statutes as "faithful
agents" of Congress, or as agents of "the People," empowered to
establish federal policy in partnership with Congress.6
This Article argues that how courts ought to interpret federal
statutes is not only a "horizontal" question of the separation of powers
between federal courts and Congress, but also a "vertical" question of
the proper relationship between Congress and state courts-in other
words, a federalism question. State courts play an important, often
independent, role in the interpretation of federal statutes.
Accordingly, the question of how they ought to interpret federal
statutes should figure prominently in federal statutory interpretation
debates. The answer to this question does not depend on what, as a

3.

See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 7 (1987)

(proposing "a new relationship between courts and statutes, a relationship that would enable us
to retain the legislative initiative in lawmaking.., while restoring to courts their common law
function of seeing to it that the law is up to date"); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 11 (1994) (arguing that American courts are justified in
interpreting statutes from a different perspective than the statute's because of "changed
circumstances which give rise to unanticipated problems, developments in law and the statute's
evolution, and different political and ideological frameworks"); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating
Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 62-63 (1988) (advocating approach to statutory
interpretation under which courts supply "important direction to the development of law in a
complex, changing society" and thus "serve, but are not subservient to, legislatures"); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1522-23 (1998)
(reviewing SCALIA, supra note 1, at 16-25) (arguing that federal courts may exercise certain
common law inherent powers in interpreting federal statutes).
4.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
5.
Id. art. I, § 1.
6.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial
Power" in Statutory Interpretation,1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001); John. F. Manning,
Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretationfrom the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648 (2001)
[hereinafter Manning, Rules of Statutory Interpretation];John F. Manning, Textualism and the
Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute].
In the last decade or so, other scholars, too, have examined the methods of statutory
interpretation that prevailed in English and American courts around the time of the American
Founding. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1999); John Choon Yoo, Marshall'sPlan: The Early Supreme Court
and Statutory Interpretation, 101 YALE L. J. 1607 (1992).
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matter of separation of powers, constitutes the judicial power of the
federal courts. It depends, rather, on what, as a matter of federalism,
is the judicial power of state courts when they enforce federal statutes.
The important and independent role that state courts can play
in the interpretation of federal statutes is evident in the structure of
the Constitution. Article III vests "[t]he judicial Power of the United
States" in "one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." 7 There are
various theories of the scope of congressional discretion in creating
and regulating the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts in light of
Article 111.8 It is generally accepted, however, that even if there are
some constitutional limits on congressional power to regulate federal
court jurisdiction, Congress has broad discretion to confer or withhold
inferior federal court jurisdiction, and, correspondingly, to allow
exclusive or concurrent state court jurisdiction over cases arising
under federal law. The Supreme Court has long inferred from Article
III that federal courts "created by statute can have no jurisdiction but
such as the statute confers."9 Congress has never conferred on inferior
federal courts the full jurisdiction to which the Article III judicial
power extends. 10 Accordingly, since the time that the Constitution was
7.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
8.
Theories range from the view that Congress has near plenary jurisdiction to regulate
federal court jurisdiction, Julian Velasco, CongressionalControl Over Federal Court Jurisdiction:
A Defense of the Traditional View, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 671 (1997), to the view that Congress may
not regulate federal court jurisdiction in such a way as to impermissibly burden the vindication
of certain constitutional rights, Lawrence T. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering. Zoning
Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129 (1981). Joseph Story
famously argued in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), that Congress is
obligated to rest jurisdiction of Article III "cases" (as opposed to "controversies") in some federal
court, be the jurisdiction original or appellate. See id. at 328-36. Story also claimed that only
federal courts could exercise jurisdiction of certain kinds of claims within the Article III judicial
power, for example, federal penal action or actions within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction. See id. at 337. Professor Michael Collins has argued that at the time of the
American Founding and subsequent few decades, there was widespread understanding that
there were certain enclaves of exclusive federal jurisdiction, most notably the penal cases and
cases within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State
Court Duties, and the MadisonianCompromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 78-98.
9.
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850).
10. Inferior federal courts did not have general federal question jurisdiction until 1875. See
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (establishing statutory federal question jurisdiction in
inferior federal courts for the first time). Thus, for decades after ratification, state courts, not
federal courts, were responsible for interpreting many federal statutes in the first instance, if not
the last instance as well. Today, state courts routinely exercise concurrent jurisdiction with
federal courts over cases in which federal statutes provide a rule of decision (unless Congress has
vested exclusive jurisdiction over a case in federal courts). Indeed, if a federal statute provides a
rule of decision in a case but does not itself create or otherwise form a substantial part of a
plaintiff's claim, state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2000), federal district courts "have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
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ratified, state courts have exercised concurrent or exclusive
jurisdiction in countless cases involving the interpretation of federal
statutes.1 1
When state courts interpret federal statutes, they act as more
than mere adjuncts to the Supreme Court of the United States. The
Constitution itself limits the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review
state court determinations of federal law. 12 Moreover, Congress has
authority under the Constitution to limit the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to review federal determinations made by state
courts.' 3 In reality, state court judgments resting upon the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." As the Court has interpreted this statute,
federal district courts lack jurisdiction over cases in which federal questions are involved but in
which an assertion of federal law does not form part of the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint. In
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908), the Court held that "a suit
arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiffs statement
of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution." In other
words, as the Court explained more recently, "[a] defense that raises a federal question is
inadequate to confer federal jurisdiction." Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804,
808 (1986) (citing Mottley, 211 U.S. 149). In its latest refinement of this doctrine, the Court
explained in Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363 (2005),
that, to determine whether a federal court has statutory "arising under" jurisdiction, "the
question is, does a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and
substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally
approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities." Id. at 2368.
11. And constitutionally so, as the Supreme Court explained relatively recently in Tafflin v.
Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990): "[We have consistently held that state courts have inherent
authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of
the United States."
12. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review a state court judgment unless a party
with standing asks it to do so. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)
(explaining that "the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the caseor-controversy requirement of Article III"). The Supreme Court also does not review state court
judgments that rest upon "adequate and independent state grounds," a jurisdictional limitation
that the Court has suggested is of constitutional dimension. In Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117
(1945), the Court explained that the concern with Supreme Court review of state court
judgments that rest on adequate and independent state grounds is that the Court not "render an
advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we
corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory
opinion." Id. at 126. The Court explained that its role "is to correct wrong judgments, not to
revise opinions." Id.; see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983) ("Respect for the
independence of state courts, as well as avoidance of rendering advisory opinions, have been the
cornerstones of this Court's refusal to decide cases where there is an adequate and independent
state ground.").
13. Article III provides that "the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to
Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.2. The extent of Congress's power to regulate and make exceptions to
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is widely debated and highly contested. Indeed, it is
inextricably intertwined with the question of Congress's power to regulate the jurisdiction of
inferior federal courts. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. It suffices to say, for present
purposes, that Congress certainly has some authority to limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to review state court judgments.
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interpretation of federal statutes may-indeed, in the overwhelming
majority of cases today, do-govern the rights and duties of parties
subject to them without Supreme Court review. Unless and until the
Supreme Court interprets a federal statute differently, state court
judgments can constitute the final word on the meaning of federal law
within a state court system, as the courts of many states do not
consider themselves bound to follow the decisions of lower federal
courts on questions of federal law.14
IThus, the following is a question of real constitutional
significance: How should state courts interpret federal statutes? To put
the question in terms of statutory interpretation debates, should state
courts strive to act as faithful agents of Congress, or as partners with
Congress in the forward-looking making of federal law?
Part I of this Article describes relevant practices of state courts
in interpreting state statutes during the years immediately following
ratification. Certain scholars have observed that during the Founding
period state courts invoked doctrines such as "equity of the statute" in
interpreting state statutes to enforce statutory meanings that
expanded or limited the plain import of a statute's "letter." Scholars
have disputed, however, whether the fact that state courts "equitably"
interpreted state statutes in certain cases evidences a constitutional
understanding that the judicial power of the United States is a power
to interpret statutes dynamically, rather than as faithfully as possible
to congressional directives. An important question, however, that has
not yet factored into this debate is whether state courts interpreted
federal statutes in the same ways that they interpreted state statutes.
This Part undertakes an independent examination of the practices of
state courts in interpreting state statutes during the Founding period
and years immediately following ratification. Drawing upon the
foundations of English practice, this Part discusses the role of
legislative intent in state court interpretive practice and reveals
significant distinctions among the ways in which state courts justified
equitable interpretations. This Part lays the groundwork necessary for
understanding how the practice of state courts in interpreting federal
statutes differed from their practices in interpreting state statutes.
Part II explains how the practices of state courts in
interpreting federal statutes differed from their practices in
interpreting state statutes. In interpreting federal statutes, state
courts did not invoke equity of the statute or other interpretive
14. See Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State
Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1153-57 (1999)
(describing the varying weights that state courts give to different kinds of federal law
determinations by federal courts).
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principles to justify departures from the search for actual legislative
intent. Rather, state courts employed a host of interpretive techniques
that uniformly-by nature or by explanation of the court-were
geared toward implementing congressional intent. State courts appear
to have uniformly understood their role in interpreting federal
statutes to be to abide by the directives of Congress, as best they could
discern them-and this during decades when state actors and
institutions often questioned the legitimacy of federal action. Part II
further provides a possible explanation of why state courts uniformly
strove to implement congressional directives without invoking
doctrines of equitable interpretation that operated without regard for
manifest legislative direction. Not only was there a trend in English
and American state courts at the time favoring interpretations that
implemented actual legislative intent, but state courts may have
understood the Supremacy Clause to specifically require them to
recognize congressional supremacy.
Part III tentatively examines the implications of this analysis
for the debate over how federal courts should interpret federal
statutes. Unless federal courts properly may approach the enterprise
of interpreting federal statutes differently than state courts, an
understanding that state courts must strive to implement actual
congressional directives suggests that the federal judicial power
entails the responsibility to strive to implement actual congressional
directives as well. This Part explores, at least preliminarily, whether
federal and state courts should be understood to have different powers
when interpreting federal statutes. In other words, it explores
whether the substance of federal law should vary in certain instances
depending on whether a federal court or a state court is interpreting a
federal statute.
I. STATE COURTS, STATE STATUTES, AND THE FEDERAL SEPARATION OF
POWERS
"Equity of the statute"-a doctrine that courts invoked to apply
statutes to cases not covered by their words-and other forms of
equitable interpretation have figured prominently in debates over
federal statutory interpretation. In the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries (and preceding centuries), courts invoked
to justify
statutory
of equitable
interpretation
principles
interpretations that differed from what the plain import of a statute's
letter appeared to require. Like their English counterparts, Foundingera state courts in America employed this doctrine in certain cases
involving the interpretation of state statutes. This Part addresses
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three matters: first, how English courts and commentators employed
and justified equitable interpretations; second, how state courts in
America employed and justified equitable interpretations; and, third,
how scholars have used state court practice of making equitable
interpretations as evidence of what relevant actors understood the
Article III "judicial power of the United States" to mean.
A. Equitable Interpretations
This Section explains how English judges and other writers
employed and explained doctrines of equitable interpretation. First,
this Section describes what constituted an equitable interpretation of
a statute. Second, it describes how courts and commentators justified
equitable interpretations from the sixteenth through the late
eighteenth centuries: as effectuating the demands of reason and/or the
intent of the legislature, real or presumed. Finally, it explains how, by
the late eighteenth century, the concept of equitable interpretations as
effectuating the demands of reason stood in tension with interpretive
views more geared toward implementing actual Parliamentary
directives.
"Equity of the statute" was a doctrine that courts invoked to
extend the letter of a statute to apply to a case that the statute by its
terms did not cover. In 1793, Charles Viner described the equity of the
statute doctrine as follows: "Equity is a construction made by the
judges, that cases out of the letter of a statute, yet being within the
same mischief, or cause of the making of the same, shall be within the
same remedy that the statute provides; and the reason thereof is, for
that the law-makers could not possibly set down all cases in express
terms."15 Other English treatises and digests described equity of the
statute in similar terms. 16 An "equitable" interpretation came to mean

15.
16.

19 CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 513 (2d ed. 1791).
See 4 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 649 (5th ed. 1786) ("By an

equitable Construction, a Case not within the Letter of a Statute is sometimes holden to be
within the Meaning, because it is within the mischief for which a Remedy is provided. The
Reason for such Construction is, that the Law-maker could not set down every Case in express
Terms."); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 61 (1765) ("For

since in laws all cases cannot be foreseen or expressed, it is necessary, that when the general
decrees of the law come to be applied to particular cases, there should be somewhere a power
vested of excepting those circumstances, which (had they been foreseen) the legislator himself
would have excepted."); 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 24 (13th ed.

1788) ("Equitie is a construction made by the judges, that cases out of the letter of a stat., yet
begin within the same mischiefe, or cause of the making of the same, shall be within the same
remedie that the statute provideth: and the reason hereof is, for that the law-maker could not
possibly set downe all cases in express terms."); THOMAS WOOD, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 9 (10th ed. 1772) ("[Statutes] may be construed according to Equity; especially where
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not only one that extended a statute to apply to a case the letter did
not cover, but also one that restricted a statute not to apply to a case
that, by its terms, the statute did cover. 17 Plowden wrote in his famous
note on the case of Eyston v. Studd18 that equity "enlarges or
diminishes the letter according to its discretion." 19 It diminishes the
letter, for example, when a court does not apply a statute defining a
felony to "a man of unsound mind,"' 20 and it enlarges the letter, for
example, when a court applies a statute governing actions against
"executors" to actions against "administrators" as well. 2 1 As Plowden
explained, "there is a great diversity between these two equities, for
the one abridges the letter, the other enlarges it, the one diminishes it,
the other amplifies it, the one takes from the letter, the other adds to
it."22

There was tension among the explanations that writers offered
from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries to justify
equitable interpretations. St. Germain's famous sixteenth century
Doctor and Student acknowledged both reason and intent as distinct
justifications for equitable interpretations of statutes: "And thus it
appeareth, that sometimes a man may be excepted from... the rigor
of a statute by the law of reason, and sometimes by the intent of the
23
makers of the statute."
Some writers explained that equitable interpretations served to
reconcile statutes with reason and equity. In his early seventeenth
century work, Law or a Discourse Thereof, Henry Finch described it as
a virtue that, through equity, courts should "amplify, enlarge, and add
24
to the letter of the law" to encompass "mischiefs in the like degrees,"
as well as "abridg[e], diminish[], and tak[e] away the severity of it" to
moderate the strictness of the law. 25 Charles Viner explained in 1793
that "[j]udges have sometimes expounded the words of an act of
parliament merely contrary to the text, and sometimes have taken

they give Remedy for Wrong; or are for Expedition of Justice, or to prevent Delays; for Lawmakers cannot comprehend all cases.").
17. For a description of this development of the concept of equitable interpretations, see
Samuel Thorne, Introduction to 'SIR THOMAS EGERTON, A DISCOURSE UPON THE EXPOSITION AND

UNDERSTANDING OF STATUTES (Samuel E. Thorne ed., Huntington Library 1942).
18. (1574) 75 Eng. Rep. 688 (K.B.).
19. Id. at 695.
20. Id. at 696.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 699.
23. CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAIN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT 49 (William Muchall ed., 17th ed.
1787).
24.

SIR HENRY FINCH, LAW OR A DISCOURSE THEREOF 20 (4th ed. 1759).

25.

Id. at 56.
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things by equity of the text contrary to the text, to make them agree
with reason and equity."26 Indeed, Bacon's 1786 Abridgment cited the
case of Sheffield v. Ratcliffe for the proposition that "[t]he Power of
construing a Statute is in the Judges; who have Authority over all
Laws, and more especially over Statutes, to mould them according to
Reason and Convenience to the best and truest Use." 27
Other explanations of equitable interpretations invoked the
"intent" of the legislature, sometimes in conjunction with
considerations of reason and equity. In many cases, English courts did
not justify equitable interpretations as effectuating actual legislative
intent; rather, courts interpreted statutes equitably as a means of
constructing a presumed legislative intent. 28 In parts, Bacon's
Abridgment described equity of the statute as a means of
implementing legislative intent through an exercise of imaginative
reconstruction. As Bacon's 1786 edition stated:
In order to form a right Judgment, whether a Case be within the Equity of a Statute, it
is a good Way to suppose the Law-maker present; and that you have asked him this
question, Do you intend to comprehend the Case? Then you must give yourself such
Answer, as you imagine he being an upright and reasonable Man would have given. If
this be, that he did mean to comprehend it, you may safely hold the Case to be within
the Equity of the Statute: For while you do no more than he would have done, you do not
29
act contrary to the Statute but in Conformity thereto.

There are examples from the sixteenth century of English
courts presuming legislative intent from the dictates of reason and
equity along these lines. In Stradling v. Morgan,30 it was explained
that in making equitable interpretations, courts "have ever been
26. 19 VINER, supra note 15, at 513. Sir Christopher Hatton set forth the earlier roots of
this idea in his 1677 treatise on statutes:
All Statutes may be expounded by Equity so far forth as Epicaia goeth, that is, an exception of
the Law of God; and Law of Reason from the general words of the Law of Man; for such cases are
taken for understood, and what is understood is not out of the Law. By the Law of Reason, I
mean, as the Author of the Book called, The Doctor and Student, doth the Law Eternal, or the
Will of God, known to every man by the light of natural Reason.
SIR CHRISTOPHER HATTON, A TREATISE CONCERNING STATUTES, OR ACTS OF PARLIAMENT AND
THE EXPOSITION THEREOF 31-32 (1677).

27. 4 BACON, supra note 16, at 643. In Sheffield v. Ratcliffe, (1616) 80 Eng. Rep. 475 (K.B.),
the court explained it as follows:
If you ask me then, by what rule the judges guided themselves in this diverse explanation of the
self-same word and sentence? I answer, it was by that liberty and authority which judges have
over laws, especially over statute laws, according to reason and best convenience, to mould them
to the truest and best use.
Id. at 486.
28. See Hans W. Baade, The Casus Omissus: A Pre-History of Statutory Analogy, 20
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 45, 77, 81 (1994) (explaining that seminal English cases referring to
"intent" of the "makers" of an act did not mean "actual intent").
29. 4 BACON, supra note 16, at 649.
30. 1 Plow. 199, (1560) 75 Eng. Rep. 305 (Ex.).
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guided by the intent of the legislature, which they have always taken
according to the necessity of the matter, and according to that which is
consonant to reason and good discretion." 31 In Stowel v. Zouch, 32 it was
reported that "counsel on the other side ... have sought help from the
intent of the makers of the act, which intent is not found in the
express letter of the purview and exception, but is gathered from
reason. '33 Likewise, in Fulmerston v. Steward,34 the Court of King's
Bench explained that "it cannot be reasonably taken that ... the
intent of the makers of the statute" was that which "would be against
all reason and equity."35 Accordingly, the court explained, "it is most
reasonable to expound the words, which seem contrary to reason,
according to good reason and equity."36 Though there is some question
whether the concept of legislative intent was doing any real work in
determining statutory meaning where intent was presumed from
reason, 37 there is no question that from as early as the middle of the
sixteenth century through the eighteenth century, courts invoked the
concept of legislative intent-even presumed intent-to justify their
interpretations in light of the developing recognition of Parliamentary
38
sovereignty.
As the recognition of Parliamentary sovereignty coalesced from
the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, judges appealed not
only to presumed legislative intent but to actual legislative intent as
39
well in order to justify equitable interpretations. Heydon's Case
provides a prominent example of this phenomenon. In a passage well
cited in subsequent centuries, the Exchequer laid out "four things...
to be discerned and considered" for "the sure and true interpretation of
all statutes in general":
1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.

31. Id. at 315.
32. 1 Plow. 353, (1569) 75 Eng. Rep. 536 (Ex. Ch.).
33. Id. at 549.
34. (1553) 75 Eng. Rep. 160 (K.B.).
35. Id. at 171.
36. Id. See also Stowel v. Lord Zouch, (1569) 75 Eng. Rep. 536, 553 (C.B.) (explaining that to
apply an act of the legislature to a person of unsound mind "would be very unreasonable, which
is never to be presumed in the legislature").
37. Professor John Manning has argued that, to the extent that intent effectively meant
that which was reasonable or equitable, recitations of the word intent in cases of equitable
interpretations do not necessarily evidence an understood faithful agent jurisprudence. Manning,
Equity of the Statute, supra note 6, at 34. Professor William Eskridge describes legislative intent
mostly as something "imputed" by the court during the Founding period and subsequent years.
See Eskridge, supra note 6, at 1083.
38. See Thorne,supra note 17, at 59.
39. (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex.).
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2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth.
And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy .... 40

The court proceeded to explain "the office of all the Judges" as:
always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the
remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief,
and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the4 1cure and remedy, according to
the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.

This passage seemingly makes reference to a mischief of which
Parliament actually was aware and that Parliament actually meant to
remedy.
By the eighteenth century, judges often described legislative
intent as determinative of statutory meaning. There is no need here to
retrace in full the history of statutory interpretation in English courts
from Tudor England through the late eighteenth century. Suffice it to
say, as others have well explained, that Parliamentary sovereignty
came to play a significant role in eighteenth century cases of statutory
interpretation. Hans Baade and James Landis have argued that in
Tudor and early Stuart England, "equity of the statute" doctrine was a
means by which judges wrote sound policy into general statutory
language. 42 By the eighteenth century, however, the legislative
sovereignty of Parliament was established, and the King's judges
could no longer justify equity of the statute doctrine as an exercise of
royal prerogative. 43 As Samuel Thorne explained, "As acts of
Parliament take on the attributes of modern legislation, the intention
of the legislator must grow in importance and take the place of the
44
equity, conjectured purpose or reason that had controlled earlier."
Accordingly, by Blackstone's day, "Parliament became the sovereign
and the duty of the judge was recognized to be merely to determine
what Parliament has said and to 'apply' it."45

40. Id. at 638.
41. Id. (first emphasis added).
42. Baade, supra note 28, at 74-83; see also James M. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of
Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213, 216 (Roscoe Pound ed., 1934) (arguing that during this
period, "exceptions dictated by sound policy were written by judges into loose statutory
generalizations").
43. See Baade, supra note 28, at 83-91 (explaining evolution of equity of the statute doctrine
from the Glorious Revolution through the eighteenth century); Manning, Equity of the Statute,
supra note 6, at 47-52(same).
44. Thorne, supra note 17, at 59.
45. Id.
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This is not to say that English judges in the eighteenth century
uniformly and unfailingly sought to implement actual legislative
directives in cases involving acts of Parliament. But there are
observable facts evidencing movement in that direction. First, certain
eighteenth century writers described legislative intent as something
real, not merely something to be presumed. For William Blackstone,
the pursuit of legislative will justified all proper methods of statutory
interpretation: "The fairest and most rational method to interpret the
will of the legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when
the law was made, by signs the most natural and probable. And these
signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects
and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law."46 Relatedly,
certain writers described the concept of legislative purpose or object
not as something to be discerned from the dictates of reason but as
something actually willed by Parliament and existing apart from the
dictates of reason. Blackstone, for instance, explained that "if the
parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is
unreasonable, I know of no power that can control it... and... that
where the main object of a statute is unreasonable the judges are [not]
at liberty to reject it; for that were to set the judicial power above that
47
of the legislature, which would be subversive of all government."
Second, certain judges came to emphasize the need for courts to
enforce the letter of a statute over other means of determining
legislative intent. In 1742, in Colehan v. Cooke,48 the Lord Chief
Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, Sir John Willes, wrote of
legislative intent not as an empty vessel designed to hold the reason or
equity by which judges would determine statutory meaning, but as a
limitation on judicial discretion: "When the words of an Act are
doubtful and uncertain, it is proper to inquire what was the intent of
the Legislature: but it is very dangerous for Judges to launch out too
far in searching into the intent of the Legislature, when they have
expressed themselves in plain and clear words." 4 9 In 1793, in Bradley
v. Clark,50 Justice Francis Buller expressed a preference for the letter
of a statute over its purposes in implementing legislative intent:
With regard to the construction of statutes according to the intention of the Legislature,
we must remember that there is an essential difference between the expounding of

46.

1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at 59.

47. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at 91 (emphasis added).
48. (1742) 125 Eng. Rep. 1231 (C.P.).
49. Id. at 1233; see also 4 BACON, supra note 16, at 652 ("But where the Meaning is plain no
Consequences are to be regarded in the Constitution; for this would be assuming a Legislative
Authority.").
50. (1793) 101 Eng. Rep. 111 (K.B.).

1514

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:5:1501

modern and ancient acts of Parliament. In early times, the Legislature used (and I
believe it was a wise course to take) to pass laws in general and in few terms: they were
left to the Courts of Law to be construed, so as to reach all the cases within the
mischiefs to be remedied. But, in modern times, great care has been taken to mention
the particular cases within the contemplation of the Legislature; and, therefore, the
Courts are not permitted to take
the same liberty in construing them as they did in
51
expounding the ancient statutes.

Indeed, certain writers rejected the concept of legislative intent
altogether as a means of assessing how judges should implement
Parliamentary commands.
In Millar v. Taylor,52 the concept of
"intention of the legislature" was rejected on the ground that
legislators and various houses of legislatures cannot have a collective
intention. 53 It was the rise of the idea that judges should acknowledge
Parliamentary sovereignty that necessitated a critique of legislative
intent as a useful juridical construct.
Notwithstanding the apparent movement of some judges
toward interpretive methods designed to implement actual legislative
directives, certain judges continued to engage in old-style reasonbased equitable interpretations. The decision of King's Bench in 1785
in Jones v. Smart54 illuminates the tension that came to exist between
reason-based equitable interpretations and more directive-based views
on the enterprise of statutory interpretation. The question in Jones
was whether Smart was liable for killing game without being duly
qualified under an Act of Parliament. The opinion of Justice Edward
Willes typified the view that judges could employ the dictates of
reason and equity to define the operation of a statute. Willes argued
that "nothing can be more oppressive than the present system of game
laws" and that "wherever a law is productive of tyranny, I shall ever
give my consent to narrow the construction. ' 55 Justice Buller rejected
this approach, arguing that "we are bound to take the Act of
Parliament, as they have made it: a casus omissus can in no case be
supplied by a Court of Law, for that would be to make laws; nor can I
conceive that it is our province to consider, whether such a law that
has been passed be tyrannical or not. ' 56 Lord Ashurst adopted a
middling position, explaining that courts may "suppose what they
meant to say" when legislatures found statutes upon reason, but that
courts should "adopt what they have actually said" when legislatures

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 113-14.
(1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.).
Id. at 2332.
(1785) 99 Eng. Rep. 963 (K.B.).
Id. at 965 (Willes, J.).
Id. at 967 (Buller, J.).
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enact "positive rules."57 This case well illustrates how, by the time of
the American Founding, the reason-based concept of the equitable
interpretation was in tension with interpretive views more geared
toward implementing actual legislative directives, discernable through
the words or "real" object of an act.
B. State Courts and State Statutes

In the late eighteenth century, reason-based equitable
interpretations stood in tension with more directive-based
interpretative views in American state courts as well. This Section
explains how American state courts employed and explained the
concept of the equitable interpretation in construing state statutes.
First, it describes how state courts, like English courts, justified
equitable interpretations. State courts variously justified them on the
basis of reason, on the basis of some conception of intent (real or
presumed), or on the basis of both reason and intent (usually
presumed to accord with reason). Second, it explains how, in many
cases, state courts meant, by invoking legislative intent, to
acknowledge legislative supremacy in lawmaking. From this, the
tension that existed between, on the one hand, interpretation as
effectuating the demands of reason and, on the other hand,
interpretation as effectuating actual legislative directives becomes
palpable.
In many cases in which state judges equitably interpreted state
statutes, they said little to explain why they were interpreting them
equitably (at least as their opinions were reported).58 In other cases,

57. Id. at 966 (Ashurst, J.).
58. See, e.g., Williams v. Fitch, 1 Root 316, 316 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1791) (reporter's note)
(holding that depositions taken without notice to plaintiff were inadmissible; concluding that
though statute permitted depositions to be taken without notice if adverse party lived more than
twenty miles away, "it is clearly within the reason and equity of the statute" to require
notification of adverse party's known agent or attorney living within twenty miles); Borland v.
Sharp, 1 Root 178, 178 (Conn. Super Ct. 1790) (reporter's note) (relieving debt contracted before
war even though renewal of note after war placed debt outside of statute's literal terms); Oystead
v. Shed, 8 Mass. (7 Tyng) 272, 272 (1811) (where statute provided that writ must be endorsed by
plaintiff and plaintiff absconded after endorsing writ, holding that equity of statute embraced an
order to furnish new endorser); Paine v. Ulmer, 7 Mass. (6 Tyng) 317, 318 (1811) (concluding
that allowing administrator of estate to prosecute action against sheriff for deputy's failure to
execute judgment on debt owed to deceased was within equity of the statute); Hastings v.
Dickinson, 7 Mass. (1 Tyng) 153, 155 (1810) (where wife agreed, in exchange for promise of an
annuity upon husband's death, not to claim any right of dower in estate, and insolvency of
husband's estate deprived her of that annuity, holding that claim to a right of dower was within
equity of statute recognizing such a right in other circumstances of failed consideration); Pitts v.
Hale, 3 Mass. 321, 322 (1807) (allowing executor to pursue action of replevin because doing so
was within the equity of the statute); Paine v. Gill, 2 Mass. 136, 136 (1806) (allowing new
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however, state courts explained themselves by differing justifications.
In some cases, they described equitable interpretation as a means of
effectuating legislative intent, and in other cases they described it as a
means of effectuating reason. The 1790 Maryland case of Griffith's
Lessee v. Ridgely59 illustrates these two approaches. In Ridgely, a
Maryland court addressed whether a deed of land from Catharine
Griffith to Charles Ridgely was ineffective because it was recorded in
the wrong court. Maryland law generally required deeds to be first
acknowledged in the Provincial (later known as General) Court and
then filed in either the General Court or a County Court. A Maryland
statute provided, additionally, that when a person "shall live remote
from the ProvincialCourt," he or she could acknowledge and record a
deed in the County Court where the person resided. 60 In Ridgely,
Catharine Griffith acknowledged her deed before justices in Anne
Arundel County and recorded it in the General Court, a method that
the statute by its terms did not recognize. 6 1 The question for decision
was whether the statute permitted a person who acknowledged a deed
before a County Court to record it in the General Court.
The trial court equitably interpreted the statute to permit
acknowledgment in a County Court and recording in the General
Court on grounds that it was reasonable to do so. The court explained
that "it is within the equity of the act, that the deed should be
recorded in the General as well as the County Court, and no reason
can be assigned why it should not." 62 The court explained that there
was a reason why certificates of recording should not go from one
county to another, specifically that "the Justices of one county had no
cognisance of the powers of the other." 63 But, the court continued,
since "the General Court Judges pervaded the whole," there was no
reason why Griffith could not acknowledge in County Court and
record in the General Court. 64 In line with the trial court's opinion in
Ridgely, there are several reported cases from around this time in

treasurer to be substituted as endorser on writ, on theory that doing so fell within the equity of
the statute); Hann v. M'Cormick, 4 N.J.L. 109, 2 (1818) (allowing plaintiff to recover costs upon
the reversal of judgment on certiorari on grounds that a proceeding on certiorari was "within the
spirit and equity of the statute"); In re Roberts, 1 N.Y. Ch. Ann. 536 (1817) (concluding that
compensation for committee of lunatic was within equity of statute providing for compensation of
guardians, executors, and administrators).
59. 2 H. & McH. 418 (Md. 1790).
60. 1766 Md. Laws c. 14, § 3.
61. Ridgely, 2 H. & McH. at 451.
62. Id. at 434.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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which state courts equitably interpreted state statutes to accord with
65
considerations of reason.
On appeal in Ridgely, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's interpretation, but justified the interpretation on grounds that
it comported with what the Maryland Legislature presumptively
intended. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that "[tlhe
act ought to receive a liberal construction," 66 for "it cannot be
presumed that the Legislature meant to confine the recording of such
a deed to the County Court, when all others are permitted to be
recorded in the Provincial (now General) Court."6 7 In line with the
Court of Appeals opinion in Ridgely, there are several examples of
state courts equitably interpreting state statutes around this time to
68
implement the presumptive intent of state legislatures.
In some cases, state courts gleaned presumptive intent from
the demands of reason. A pair of South Carolina cases illustrate this
practice. In 1789, in Ham v. McClaws, 69 a South Carolina court
construed an act prohibiting the importation of slaves into the state in
certain circumstances. The court explained that "[i]n the present
instance, we have an act before us, which, were the strict letter of it
applied to the case of the present claimants, would be evidently
against common reason." Accordingly, the court deemed itself
bound to give such a construction to this enacting clause of the act of 1788, as will be
consistent with justice, and the dictates of natural reason, though contrary to the strict
letter of the law; and this construction is, that the legislature never had it in their
contemplation to make a forfeiture of the negroes in question, and subject the parties to
so heavy a penalty for bringing slaves into
the State, under the circumstances and for
70
the purposes, the claimants have proved.

65. See, e.g., Smith v. Ruescastle, 7 N.J.L. 357, 361 (N.J. 1800) (explaining that general
statutory language was "to be construed liberally, and to effectuate the purposes of justice");
Weatherhead v. Lessee of Bledsoe's Heirs, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 352, 358 (1815) (explaining that in
interpreting statutes of limitations, "courts are frequently led imperceptibly into a train of
reasoning for the attainment of justice, without sufficiently regarding the policy of the law" and
that "[hience arise constructions which will not bear the examination of cool and abstract
reasoning"); cf. Mitchell v. Smith, 4 Yeates 84, 92 (Pa. 1804) (explaining that "[g]eneral
principles of law and reason" can "apply in giving construction to" a statute, but that, in the
given case, "the implied legislative construction contended for is expressly guarded against").
66. Ridgely, 2 H. & McH. at 452.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Sumner v. Child, 2 Conn. 607, 619 (1818) ("[Tlhough [the case in question] does
not come within the literal construction, it is, unquestionably, within the equity of the statute;
and if the legislature had contemplated the possible existence of such a case, they would have
provided for it .... ).
69. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 93 (S.C. Com. P1. Gen. Sess. 1789).
70. Id. at 98.
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Similarly, in the 1803 South Carolina case of State v.
Harkness,71 the state indicted Harkness for receiving the meat of
cattle that had been stolen. The question was whether the state could
proceed against him under a 1769 South Carolina statute that
punished receipt of stolen goods in certain circumstances "by fine,
whipping, and standing in the pillory."72 Harkness argued that the
court should read a 1789 South Carolina statute punishing cattle
stealing by a fine 73 to equitably limit the application of the 1769 act in
cases involving cattle. The court agreed:
[T]o subject the receiver of the meat of such beasts to fine, public whipping, and
standing in the pilliary, all which the act of 1769 provides, as the punishment of the
misdemeanor for receiving of stolen goods knowingly, would be disproportionate
and
74
unreasonable; and, therefore, could not have been intended by the legislature.

Construing the 1769 act to apply to Harkness, the court concluded,
"would be contrary to reason, and the general principles of law." 75
Though these courts presumed a legislative intent from
considerations of reason and justice, it is not necessarily the case that
their appeals to legislative intent lacked any normative significance
respecting the legitimacy of their decisions. In some cases in which
courts interpreted statutes according to the legislature's presumptive
intent, they made clear that what justified their decisions was the
intent of the legislature. In Lloyd v. Urison, for example, Justice
William Pennington of the Supreme Court of Judicature of New Jersey
explained that "cases will arise, when the plain unequivocal words in
a statute ... may lead to gross absurdity or manifest injustice, which
it cannot reasonably be supposed that the legislature intended. In
such cases, courts have, but as I apprehend with much caution,
departed from the strict letter and resorted to the next best evidence,
of the intent of the law maker." 76 The reason for presuming an intent
in such cases, Pennington set forth, was that there was "[n]o doubt but

71. 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 276 (1803).
72. 1769 S.C. Acts 306.
73. 1789 S.C. Acts 139.
74. Harkness, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) at 278.
75. Id.; see also Lloyd v. Urison, 2 N.J.L. 197, 200-01 (N.J. 1807) (Rossell, J.) (giving statute
construction "which law and reason will best warrant" in order to discern legislative intent);
People v. Platt, 17 Johns. 195, 216 (N.Y. 1819) ("[Tjhe legislature would, no doubt, have excepted
the Saranacout of the operation of the statutes, had all the facts been known to them."); Bedford
v. Shilling, 4 Serg. & Rawle 401, 403 (Pa. 1818) (Tilghman, C.J.) (explaining that "nothing less
than positive expressions would warrant the court in giving a construction which would work
manifest injustice," for "[ilt
must not be supposed that the legislature meant to do injustice").
76. Lloyd, 2 N.J.L. at 223.
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that the meaning and intention of the legislature is to govern the
77
construction of statutes."
In other cases, state courts justified equitable interpretations
of state statutes on grounds of actual legislative intent. Courts
equitably interpreting statutes often addressed themselves to the
"mischief' or "inconvenience" that the statute was intended to remedy
or the "object" that the statute was intended to achieve. 78 To be sure, a
court might impute a legislative intent from the mischief or object that
the court deemed it most reasonable for the statute to remedy or
serve. In many cases, however, courts appear to have pursued an
actual legislative intent rather than seeking to impute an intent to the
legislature.
A South Carolina case again provides an interesting study. In
Wall v. Robson,79 the Constitutional Court of Appeals of South
Carolina had to determine whether a statute of limitations enacted in
1712 applied to certain actions. The court considered the colonial
legislature's actual intent and its presumed intent as distinct
inquiries, both relevant to the question presented. The court first
considered what the colonial legislature actually had in mind in 1712.
"[Clan any man," the court explained, "bring himself to believe, that
the Colonial Legislature of South-Carolina, at that day, say 1712, (108
years ago) could possibly have had it in contemplation to have
regulated the nature of actions between foreign merchants and the
citizens of South-Carolina" in the way alleged?8 0 "Utterly impossible!
The idea is too romantic to be indulged for a single moment."8 1 The
court then proceeded to perform an exercise in imaginative
reconstruction of a presumed intent as a distinct inquiry:
But to go one step further, and the more immediately to apply Plowden's rule; suppose
for a moment it were possible to call up the members of the Legislature of 1712, from
their slumbers in the tomb, and that they were present, and asked Plowden's question,
did you intend that the Statute of Limitations, you have just passed, should bar foreign
merchants of their actions for just debts, where they have been prevented by war from
bringing suits for the recovery of them? I presume there is no man who hears the

77. Id. at 222.
78. Sanford v. Sanford, 5 Day 353, 357 (Conn. 1812) ('This practical construction seems,
clearly, to be within the equity of the statute; the object of which was, a reasonable allowance to
the innocent and unfortunate wife, out of the estate of an offending and unprincipled husband.");
Davis's Ex'rs v. Fulton, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) 121, 135 (Super. Ct. L. & Eq. 1799)(Overton, J.) ("In
order to understand the meaning and extent of the section we will consider the inconvenience
which was intended to be remedied."); id. at 138 ("The equitable meaning of the Legislature is
the object.").
79. 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 498 (S.C. Const. App. Ct. 1820).
80.

Id. at 500.

81.

Id.
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question asked, would hesitate8 a2 moment in concluding, that the answer would be una
voce, we had no such intention.

State courts justified equitable interpretations as effectuating
actual legislative intent when, in certain cases, they pursued the
"true" intent of a statute. In Whitney v. Whitney,8 3 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts explained that "[t]he language of a
statute is not to be construed according to technical rules, unless such
be the apparent meaning of the legislature. Therefore many cases, not
expressly named, may be comprehended within the equity of a statute;
the letter of which may be enlarged or restrained, according to the true
intent of the makers of the law. ''8 4 By "true" intent, a court could mean
"true" because the intent was truly held by the legislature, or "true"
because the court imputed the intent to comport with true reason. In
some cases, it is clear that by "true" intent, courts unquestionably
meant real or actual intent. In Davidson's Lessee v. Beatty,8 5 for
example, the General Court of Maryland explained in 1797 that "[t]he
true and genuine construction of a statute, is to gratify the meaning
and intention of the makers thereof; and the expositions of judges and
lawyers cotemporary with the law in its origin, afford the strongest
'8 6
evidence of what that intention was.
State courts also justified equitable interpretations as fulfilling
actual legislative intent when, in certain cases, they referred to the
reason or object of a statute, as opposed to reason itself. A common
statement of equity of the statute doctrine was that "the construction
of this statute should be taken largely, and by equity extended so as to
embrace all cases within the mischief which it was intended to
remedy ....
,"87 In several cases, courts made clear that this principle
of construction was geared toward effectuating actual legislative
intent. In Gates v. Brattle,88 the Superior Court of Connecticut
described a statute as having two parts, "the letter and the reason, 8' 9
and that implementing the reason was implementing what the
legislature actually directed: "However the legislature might have
been induced, from many and various reasons, both of policy and
justice, to make the law; the law when made, is the rule which must
82. Id.
83. 14 Mass. 88 (1817).
84. Id. at 92-93 (emphasis added).
85. 3 H. & McH. 594 (Md. Gen. 1797).
86. Id. at 623. In Simpson v. Morris, 3 Yeates 104 (Pa. 1800), Chief Justice Edward Shippen
observed that "[t]he act is obscurely and incorrectly worded; but we must endeavor, as well as we
can, to discover the plain and real intention of the legislature." Id. at 115.
87. Nichols v. Wells, 2 Ky. (Sneed) 255, 259 (1803).
88. 1 Root 187 (Conn. Super. 1790).
89. Id. at 189 (emphasis added).
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govern the judges and the citizens. The question then is not, what the
law ought to have been, or why it was made? but what it is."90
Similarly, in Overton's Lessee v. Campbell,91 Justice John Haywood of
the Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals of Tennessee explained that
courts must implement the spirit of the law, not the spirit that a law
ought to have: "[I]t is our duty to ascend to the source and spirit of the
law, and not rest the rights of the citizen upon any opinions whatever
entertained by those not constitutionally intrusted to form them."92 In
certain cases, state courts explained that in equitably interpreting
it
statutes they must determine the object of a statute, or the mischief
93
legislature.
the
of
intent
"true"
the
from
remedy,
to
designed
was
Whether equitably interpreting statutes or not, state courts
invoked the concept of legislative intent in countless cases involving
statutory interpretation. Several state courts invoked the concept in
express recognition of legislative supremacy. Some courts explained
that the pursuit of legislative intent was the object of statutory
construction. In Martin v. Commonwealth,94 a case before the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Justice Theodore Sedgwick
explained that "[i]n construing statutes, the great object is to discover
from the words, the subject matter, the mischiefs contemplated, and
the remedies proposed, what was the true meaning and design of the
legislature."95 In other cases, state courts described the pursuit of
90. Id. See also Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 486 (N.Y. 1811) (Spencer, J.) ("Statutes
are to be so construed as may best answer the intention which the makers had in view, and the
intention is, sometimes, to be collected from the cause or necessity of making a statute; and a
thing within the intention of the makers of a statute is as much within the statute as if it were
within the letter.").
91. 6 Tenn. (3 Hawy.) 164 (Tenn. Err. & App. 1818).
92. Id. at 223.
93. See, e.g., Preston v. Crofut, 1 Conn. 527, 551 (1811) (Reeve, J.) ("When we give a
construction to a statute, if we find that such construction will probably defeat the object which
the legislature had in view, we ought to be very jealous of it: nay, I lay it down as a sound rule,
that it is not the true construction."); Collins v. Collins' Ex'rs, 4 N.C. (Car. L. Rep.) 301, 303
(1815) (Seawell, J.) ("In the exposition of all instruments, the intention of the makers is the only
guide. And as regards statutes, it is a very ancient rule, to consider the old law, the mischief, and
the remedy. And Lord Coke has ventured to assert, that it is the office of Judges always to make
such construction as shall repress the mischief and advance the remedy, according to the true
intent of the makers.').
94. 1 Mass. 347 (1805).
95. Id. at 390; see also Davidson's Lessee v. Beatty, 3 H. & McH. 594, 623 (Md. Gen. 1797)
('The true and genuine construction of a statute, is to gratify the meaning and intention of the
makers thereof ... "); Seidenbender v. Charles's Adm'rs, 4 Serg. & Rawle 151, 164 (Pa. 1818)
(Gibson, J.) ('The key of the construction of a statute, is the intention of the legislature, and I
readily admit, that cases seemingly within the letter, have been excluded, and indeed, the act
construed in direct opposition to the letter, to attain that intention, when it was clear beyond
dispute."). In 1770, the Provincial Court of Maryland had written along similar lines that "[t]here
is one rule of construction, however, which is universally applicable to all occasions and to all
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legislative intent as the proper duty of courts. In Stewart v. Foster,96 a
case before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Justice Jasper Yeates
wrote that "in the construction of all statutes, it is the indispensable
duty of courts of justice, to carry into execution the true intention of
the lawgivers, and that in some instances, to attain this end, the
words of the law have been enlarged, and in other instances,
restricted. '' 97 In other cases still, courts offered a separation of powers
justification for the pursuit of legislative intent in statutory
interpretation. In Fitch v. Brainerd,98 the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut pursued legislative intent on the ground that "[w]hether
the refinements of the present age, require a departure from the
ancient law upon this subject; or whether the supposed benefits of a
change would countervail its obvious mischiefs, are legislative, not
judicial questions." 99
In furtherance of such ideas regarding legislative supremacy,
there developed among certain state court judges, as among certain
English judges, the view that the duty of courts was to give statutory
text its plain import. In 1792, in State v. Willingborough Road,100 the
Supreme Court of Judicature of New Jersey construed a statute
requiring that certain surveyors be the judges of a particular matter.
In construing it, the court explained, "[n]ow, the words of the law are
clear and explicit .... It is true, that in the case of sickness [of a
surveyor] an inconvenience may happen, but this is exclusively a
matter for legislative consideration." 10 ' In similar fashion, Chief
Justice Ninian Edwards of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky derided
times. Judges are to expound acts of Parliament in such manner as may be agreeable to the
intent of the makers." Butler v. Boarman, 1 H. & McH. 371, 379 (Md. Prov. 1770).
96. 2 Binn. 110 (Pa. 1809).
97. Id. at 120; see also Boatright & Glaze v. Wingate, 7 S.C.L. (3 Brev.) 521, 547-48 (S.C.
Const. App. Ct. 1814) (Bay, J.) ("It is a duty incumbent on the court to give such a construction
on the whole, as was most consistent with the ends and designs of the law makers.").
98. 2 Day 163 (Conn. 1805).
99. Id. at 194; see also Fox v. Hills, 1 Conn. 295, 307 (1815) (Hosmer, J.) ("As a legislator I
might consider it expedient to enact the matter now endeavoured to be assumed by construction;
but I cannot believe, that the judiciary may overleap the authority delegated in terms clear and
unambiguous, on reasons which, in my judgment, do not fall within their province."); In re
Opinion of Justices, 7 Mass. (6 Tyng) 523, 524 (1811) ("The constitution is law, the people having
been the legislators; and the several statutes of the commonwealth, enacted pursuant to the
constitution, are law, the senators and representatives being the legislators. But the provisions
of the constitution, and of any statute, are the intentions of the legislature thereby manifested.");
Hubley's Lessee v. White, 2 Yeates 133, 146 (Pa. 1796) ("We cheerfully disclaim all legislative
power; but it will not be denied that we possess the right of putting such construction on the acts
of the legislature, as appears to us best to accord with their intention, either express or
implied.").
100. 1 N.J.L. 128 (N.J. 1792).
101. Id. at 130.
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the practice of equitable interpretations in the 1808 case of Hardin v.
Owings. 10 2 In his words, judges
have made the legislature mean anything, everything, and almost nothing, as suited the
particular case before them; and this will ever be the case, while this arbitrary field of
discretion is assumed and exercised by judges; and until the acts of the legislature,
according to their plain and obvious import, unembarrassed by mere technical and
artificial rules, are made the proper and governing rules of decision. If the law should
prove to be defective, inadequate to the object of it, or oppressive in its operation, it is
certainly more peculiarly the province of the legislature, than the judiciary, to supply or
remedy those defects. In the judiciary the exercise of such a power is not warranted by
the constitution under which we 10act;
it is contrary to it, and must, therefore be an
3
unjustifiable assumption of power.

Of course, this was not a universal view. There were state
courts that equitably interpreted statutes without any apparent
regard for legislative intent. As already explained, in certain cases
state courts made equitable interpretations simply on the basis of
10 4
reason and justice.

102. 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 214 (1808).
103. Id. at 216.
104. See supra notes 58-77 and accompanying text. In Wallace v. Taliaferro, 6 Va. (2 Call)
447 (1800), for example, a case before the Supreme Court of Virginia, Judge Spencer Roane
distinguished the rule that "such construction is to be put upon a statute, as may best answer
the intention the makers had in view," from the "rule of construction, which is, that the letter of
an act of Parliament may be restrained, by an equitable construction, in some cases; in others
enlarged." Id. at 467. At least one court explained that courts should effectuate legislative intent
unless it was uncertain, in which case considerations of equity should determine statutory
meaning. In Kerlin's Lessee v. Bull, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 175 (Pa. 1786), the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania explained in 1786 that "[w]here the intention of the Legislature, or the law is
doubtful, and not clear, the Judges ought to interpret the law to be, what is most consonant to
equity, and least inconvenient." Id. at 178; cf. Park's Lessee v. Larkin, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) 101,
104 (Tenn. Super. L. & Eq. 1799) (Overton, J.) ("In the construction of statutes such a meaning
ought to be given to the law, not inconsistent with the words, as will if possible effectuate the
intention of the Legislature."). In certain cases involving statutes governing judicial proceedings,
courts justified equitable interpretations as a mere exertion of the power of the court. In Simson
v. Hart, 14 Johns. 63 (N.Y. 1816), for example, the Supreme Court of New York addressed
whether a judgment recovered by one party against an insolvent party could be set off against a
judgment recovered by the insolvent party against the first party. In his opinion, which found
that there was judicial power to direct the set-off, Justice Ambrose Spencer explained that "[iun
directing a set-off of judgments, Courts of law proceed upon the equity of the statute authorizing
set-offs; for, confessedly, the case is not within the letter of the act." Id. at 75. In this context,
Justice Spencer disclaimed any justification for an equitable interpretation that depended on
legislative intent. Rather, he explained that the power of courts of law in this regard "consists in
the authority they hold over suitors in their Courts; and it may be fitly said, that the exercise of
the power is the exertion of the law of the Courts, rather than any known, express, and delegated
power." Id. See also Bergen v. Boerum, 2 Cai. 256, 257 (N.Y. 1804) (argument of counsel that
execution of judgment could be set aside on grounds that "courts of common law will extend the
equity of a statute in cases like this, and that by virtue of their general controlling power over
their own judgments" (emphasis added)).
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The 1801 Virginia case of Tomlinson v. Dillardl0 5 well
illustrates the tension that existed in turn-of-the-nineteenth-century
equitable
reason-based
between
jurisprudence
court
state
interpretations and interpretative views that courts must strive to
implement actual legislative directives. In Tomlinson, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia had to interpret a 1792 Virginia act
regulating descents. By the terms of the act, a mother who gave birth
after her husband died would take no part of the husband's real estate
after her infant died. 10 6 The act also provided that a personal estate
should go to the persons entitled to the real estate. 10 7 The judges
divided on how the statute should be construed. Judge Roane argued
that the mother should succeed to the personal estate of the infant
notwithstanding the plain letter of the act. Among other reasons, he
asserted that "even an unequivocal expression, by the Legislature,
may be controlled by consequences, and the reason of the law, taken
108
on a general view."
Judges William Fleming and Paul Carrington were more
solicitous of statutory language on grounds of legislative supremancy.
Judge Fleming disagreed that the scope of the statute should be so
equitably limited. He argued that "if inconveniences follow from a
literal construction, they must be redressed by the Legislature, and
not by the Court; who are not to torture the words in order to discover
meanings which the Legislature never had; but, are to pursue the
plain import of the statute, without regard to the consequences."1 0 9
Judge Carrington argued that a court might make an equitable
interpretation when "the expression is doubtful, and a strict
adherence to the letter might disappoint the intention of the
Legislature."'1 0 In that case, "the latitude is allowed to support, and
not to defeat the law."'' "But here," he concluded, "the law is
expressed in terms too plain to be misunderstood, and there is nothing
which leads to a conclusion, that the Legislature intended any thing
12
more than what they have explicitly declared."
Tomlinson well illustrates how, at the time of the American
Founding, reason-based equitable interpretations stood in tension
with interpretive theories that courts should implement actual
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

7 Va. (3 Call) 105 (1801).
Id. at 111.
Id.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 115.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 115-16.
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legislative commands, as evidenced by text or other indicia of "real"
legislative intent.
C. The Separationof Powers Debate
This Section explains how the practice of state courts equitably
intepreting state statutes in certain cases around the time of the
Founding has figured into separation of powers debates over the
judicial power of federal courts. It explains, moreover, that the
implications of state interpretive practices for these debates are
complex. The justifications that state judges offered for equitable
interpretations varied, and, indeed, some state judges rejected the
concept of the equitable interpretation altogether. Finally, this Section
explains that the practice of state courts which may be more relevant
to federal judicial power debates is that of state court interpretations
of federal statutes, not state statutes.
Scholars have debated whether the fact that state courts
equitably interpreted state statutes in certain cases is relevant to the
separation of powers question of how federal courts should interpret
federal statutes. Most prominently, Professors William Eskridge and
John Manning have examined what inferences, if any, about the
federal judicial power should be drawn from the practice of equitable
interpretation in English courts and American state courts during the
Founding period and years following ratification. Eskridge and
Manning agree that in certain cases decided in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, English and American courts construed
statutes without regard for what the legislature may have actually
directed. 113 What Eskridge and Manning dispute is whether the
"judicial power of the United States," as provided in Article III,
captures the power to interpret statutes in this way.
Manning argues that the Constitution's separation of powers
between the legislative and judicial branches precludes the "judicial
power of the United States" from being a power to interpret statutes
"equitably."114 Even though there are instances of early federal courts
making equitable interpretations, Manning argues, the Constitution's
system of separated powers and the judicial practice that in time

113. Manning classifies exercises of such powers collectively as "equitable interpretations"
(interpretations that reached cases omitted by statutory text or implied exceptions to statutory
text based upon the reason or spirit of the law but without particular regard to legislative
intent). Manning, Rules of Statutory Interpretation,supra note 6, at 1657. Eskridge classifies
exercises of such powers as "ameliorative, suppletive, and voidance" powers. Eskridge, supra
note 6, at 996.
114. Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 6, at 56-105.
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developed within that system supports a "faithful agent" theory of the
judicial power-"that a federal court is responsible for accurately
deciphering and implementing the legislature's commands." 115 For
Manning, the practice of state courts in interpreting state statutes is
not probative of what the "judicial power of the United States" was
understood to mean. He deems it "most unlikely that the Founders
would have taken the structural arrangements of any particular state
or set of states to be an appropriate model for federal judicial
method of
power." 116 Finally, Manning argues, textualism is a better
11 7
implementing a faithful agent theory than purposivism.
Eskridge rejects Manning's separation of powers analysis. He
argues that the background understanding of the federal judicial
power during the Founding period was that federal judges were not in
all circumstances "bound by the text or the actual expectations of the
legislature."' 11 8 Examining English cases, state court cases, ratification
debates, and opinions of the Marshall Court, Eskridge argues that
practices of the Founding period demonstrate a complex method of
statutory interpretation that is consistent with neither the faithful
agent theory nor textualism. "If anything," he explains, "the Framers
practiced and preached a highly contextual approach which was open
to revising, ameliorating, and bending statutory words in light of
reason and fundamental law, including the law of nations." 11 9 For
Eskridge, the method by which state courts interpreted state statutes
during the Founding period-a contextual method open to departures
from statutory text and actual legislative expectations-is probative of
what the framers and ratifiers understood by the 'judicial power of the
United States." 120 In Eskridge's view, federal courts "(like the
legislature) are ultimately agents of 'We the People,"' constitutionally
empowered to act as partners with Congress in the forward-looking
making of federal policy.121
It is worth noting the exact scope of the dispute between
Eskridge and Manning. Eskridge and Manning describe a great deal
of early American judicial practice of statutory interpretation in
similar terms. They agree that state judges in the 1780s and 1790s
115. Id. at 7.
116. Manning, Rules of Statutory Interpretation, supra note 6, at 1660; see also Manning,
Equity of the Statute, supra note 6, at 86 n.336 (explaining considerations that "cast doubt on the
relevance" of state court practice "to federal constitutional attitudes").
117. Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 6, at 15-22; Manning, Rules of Statutory
Interpretation,supra note 6, at 1653 n.28.
118. Eskridge, supra note 6, at 1083.
119. Id. at 1087.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 992.
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and federal judges from the time of ratification through the Marshall
Court read the words of statutes in light of ordinary usage, other laws,
canons of statutory construction, and the consequences of particular
constructions. 12 2 Manning argues that these practices are consistent
with the faithful agent theory, and, more specifically, a textualist
implementation of it. To the extent, Manning argues, that
"communication depends on a community's capacity to develop and
decode shared linguistic and cultural conventions," textualism
involves not only reading the text, but accounting for "the assumptions
shared by the speakers and the intended audience, including the
background legal understandings and conventions that a reasonably
diligent lawyer would bring to a statute in context."'123 The dispute, in
Manning's view, is whether federal judges constitutionally may
"depart from the conventional meaning of an otherwise clear and
specific text, simply because the result appears to deviate from the
statute's apparent background purpose or produces a seemingly harsh
124
outcome."
Eskridge characterizes the dispute differently. For him, there
is an antecedent question of whether the words of a statute can have a
clear and specific meaning without regard not only for their legal and
conventional understandings, but also for the statute's purpose and
the outcomes different interpretations would produce. The lesson he
draws "from the founding period is that what we today call a statutory
'plain meaning' does not preexist the judge's exploration of the
statutory language in the context of the broader landscape of the law,
the facts of the case, and (for the Supreme Court especially) the
strategic context within which the interpretation occurs." 125
There are two points to be made here regarding this debate.
First, that state courts equitably interpreted state statutes in certain
cases does not evidence a uniformly understood judicial power in state
courts to construe statutes without regard for actual legislative
commands-if we take seriously what judges professed to justify
equitable interpretations. To be sure, in certain cases judges equitably
construed statutes according to what they perceived the demands of
reason to require. In other cases, however, state judges equitably
interpreted statutes to make statutory scope comport with legislative
intent, real or presumed. For many judges, legislative intent was the
122. See id. at 1083; see also Manning, Rules of Statutory Interpretation,supra note 6, at
1658-59.
123. Manning, Rules of Statutory Interpretation,supra note 6, at 1656 (internal quotation
marks and footnote omitted).
124. Id. at 1657 (footnote omitted).
125. Eskridge, supra note 6, at 998.
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touchstone of statutory interpretation in all cases. This is not to deny
that legislative intent is a concept fraught with difficulties, not the
least of which are (1) that legislatures cannot have a real intent, (2)
that individual legislators often lack real intent regarding specific
statutory applications, and (3) that statutory purposes, from which
judges often glean intent, can be multifarious and malleable. Those
difficulties, however, do not demonstrate by their existence that late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century state judges invoking
legislative intent could not have meant to implement it in a real way.
To the contrary, as explained in the last Section, many state judges
did mean to implement real legislative intent by equitably
interpreting statutes. Moreover, certain judges who recognized the
difficulties of legislative intent as a useful juridical construct fled not
to the demands of reason as a substitute interpretive guide, but to the
fair import of statutory language. In other words, for many judges,
legislative intent did the work of acknowledging legislative
supremacy. When those judges discerned difficulties with legislative
intent as a meaningful concept in statutory interpretation, they
pursued other means of acknowledging legislative supremacy, most
notably adopting textual methods of interpretation.
Second, there is an important distinction to be drawn between
state court interpretations of state statutes and state court
interpretations of federal statutes. There are no reported cases of a
state court interpreting a federal statute in the late eighteenth or
early nineteenth century by invoking the doctrine of equity of the
statute. In most cases, state courts interpreted the text of federal
statutes according to recognized methods of textual interpretation. In
those cases in which state courts did invoke the purpose of a federal
statute or the consequences that would follow from a particular
interpretation, they did so either in support of a textual interpretation
or explicitly as a means of discerning congressional intent. In no case
did a state court profess to interpret an act of Congress on the basis of
reason set apart from actual congressional intent.
The distinctiveness of state court practice in interpreting
federal statutes is relevant to the separation of powers debate over the
judicial power of the federal courts in interpreting federal statutes.
First, it demonstrates that state courts may not have viewed
themselves as free to give federal statutes reason-based equitable
interpretations. Second, it calls into question the relevance of state
court practices in interpreting state statutes to what the "judicial
power of the United States" was understood to be. Arguably, the
distinct practices of state courts in interpreting federal statutes are
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more probative than their practices in interpreting state statutes of
how federal courts legitimately may interpret federal statutes.

II. STATE COURTS, FEDERAL STATUTES, AND FEDERALISM
This Part explains how the practices of state courts in
interpreting federal statutes differed from their practices in
interpreting state statutes. Specifically, it summarizes an analysis of
74 state court cases decided between 1789 and 1820 that involved a
question of federal statutory interpretation. This set of cases emerged
from a search for all reported cases involving a question of federal
statutory interpretation that state courts decided during this
period.126
Two points regarding methodology are in order. First, these 74
cases may not represent the complete set or a scientific sample of all
cases involving the interpretation of federal statutes that state courts
decided during this period. During this time, the reporting of state
court decisions was neither as complete nor as accurate as it is today,
and of course not all state court decisions were reported. The sample
contains only cases that were reported, as they were reported. Second,
the time period 1789 until 1820 encompasses not only the time of the
Founding and the immediate decades thereafter, but also several
difficult episodes of "federal-state relations." The purpose of this Part
is to determine what, in light of the constitutional settlement, state
courts understood their responsibility to be when faced with questions
of federal statutory interpretation. Several federal statutes enacted
during this period related to well known events that tested, if not
defined, the strength of the Union: the establishment of a federal
judiciary, the federal assumption of state debts, the establishment of
the Bank of the United States, the Quasi-War with France, the
acquisition of the Louisiana territory, and the War of 1812, to name a
few. A state court practice in interpreting federal statutes that
remained constant throughout the ebb and flow of such events, if
indeed any such identifiable practice exists, would seem to constitute

126. I identified most of these cases by searching the Westlaw database "ALLSTATES-OLD"
for "(act w/3 (cong!))" or "United States." During the relevant time period, state and federal
courts conventionally referred to federal statutes as "acts of Congress," and state cases involving
federal statutes commonly made reference, for one reason or another, to the "United States." The
search, albeit greatly over-inclusive, appears to have served its intended purpose fairly well. It
turned up hundreds of cases, which I reviewed to identify those involving the interpretation of
federal statutes. Several subsequent searches using more focused search terms-based, for
example, on the names or language of specific federal statutes-failed to turn up cases that the
more general search did not identify.
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good evidence of what state courts understood their responsibilities in
127
interpreting federal statutes to be.
This Part concludes by offering possible explanations of why
state courts did not give federal statutes reason-based equitable
constructions.
A. How State Courts InterpretedFederal Statutes
Of the seventy-four cases examined in this study, twenty-eight
summarily stated the meaning of a federal statute without providing
any significant analysis. Of those twenty-eight cases, twenty-one
declared the meaning of a federal statute, 128 and eight declared the
127. This is not to say that after 1820, federal-state relations normalized without ongoing
difficulties. We know of course that that is not true. I selected 1820 as a cut-off on the theory
that, even if state court practices in interpreting federal statutes changed after 1820, three
decades of consistent state court practice following upon ratification of the Constitution would be
more probative of historical constitutional understandings than any subsequent practices that
may have developed.
128. See Bissell v. Edwards, 5 Day 363, 365-367 (Conn. 1812) (Swift, J. and Baldwin, J.)
(declaring different interpretations of the Full Faith and Credit statute with respect to the
applicability of the Act to records and judicial proceedings of justices of the peace); Nichols v.
Ruggles, 3 Day 145, 158 (Conn. 1808) (Swift, J. and Smith, J., dissenting) (explaining that
provisions of federal copyright act are directory and that the court cannot take intent of
reprinting into consideration); Clarkson's Lessee v. Stevens, 2 Del. Cas. 27, 28 (Del. 1808)
(stating that federal Full Faith and Credit statute "goes to prescribe one mode by which papers
could be authenticated in the different states, but it does not abrogate those laws which had
prescribed another mode"); Hart v. Strode, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 115, 116 (1819) (stating that
some provisions of the federal bankruptcy act create "exceptions to the general doctrine
regarding the proof required to establish bankruptcy... [b]ut these provisions do not embrace
the present case"); Haggin v. Squires, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 334, 335 (1811) (stating that "[t]he record in
question... does not come within the provision of the [Full Faith and Credit statute]"); Edwards
v. Coleman, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 204, 205 (1810) (observing "[t]hat the assignees have the sole and
exclusive right to demand and sue for any part of the property thus vested in them, is obvious
from the letter as well as the manifest spirit" of the federal bankruptcy act); New Orleans v.
Casteres, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 673, 674 (La. 1815) (stating what the court deemed to be a "fair
construction" of the act of Congress admitting Louisiana to the Union); Campbell v. Morris, 3 H.
& McH. 535, 568 (Md. 1797) (reciting what an act of Congress establishing the District of
Columbia as the national capital "expressly provides"); Bartlet v. Prince, 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) 431,
436 (1812) (reporting that "[t]he Chief Justice observed that he had always conceived that by
insolvency, in the acts of Congress, was to be understood some overt and notorious act, which the
laws of the state recognize as an insolvency"); Gelston v. Hoyt, 1 Johns. Ch. 543, 546-47 (N.Y. Ch.
1815) (stating that two small governments were not "foreign states" under an Act of Congress
governing the seizure of vessels); Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. 69, 74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (stating
that Enemy Alien Act is "a true exposition and declaration of the modern law of nations"); Brush
v. Bogardus, 8 Johns. 157, 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (explaining that Act of Congress exempting
certain persons from militia duty exempted "all mariners actually employed in the sea-service"
and that "[t]he plaintiff was certainly not a mariner within the purview of this act"); Parsons v.
Barnard, 7 Johns. 144, 145 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (explaining that as an Act of Congress gave
federal circuit courts exclusive jurisdiction of patent cases, the state court had no jurisdiction);
Wright v. Deacon, 5 Serg. & Rawle 62, 64 (Pa. 1819) (Tilghman, C.J.) (stating that "[i]t plainly
appears, from the whole scope and tenor of the [Fugitive Slave Act] that the fugitive was to be
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intent or object of Congress in enacting the statute. 29 The forty-six
remaining cases determined the meaning of federal statutes in the
following ways: (1) by examining specific statutory language; (2) by
considering English statutes or background principles of common law
or general law; and (3) by examining statutory purposes or the
consequences of adopting a particular statutory meaning. Most often,
state courts interpreted federal statutes based on some combination of
these methods. This Section explains how state courts employed each
130
of these methods of statutory analysis.

delivered up, on a summary proceeding, without the delay of a formal trial in a court of common
law"); Downing v. Kintzing, 2 Serg. & Rawle 326, 335, 339-40, 343-44 (Pa. 1816) (opinions of
Chief Justice Tilghman and Justice Yeates, and dissenting opinion of Justice Gibson,
interpreting in summary fashion the meaning of an act of Congress affording a preference to the
United States with respect to certain debts); Willing v. Bleeker, 2 Serg. & Rawle 221, 224 (Pa.
1816) (Tilghman, C.J.) (stating that "[t]he assignment... falls directly within the law" governing
duties on imports and tonnage); Commonwealth v. Callan, 6 Binn. 255, 256 (Pa. 1814) (stating
that "[t]he mother is a parent within [an Act of Congress governing enlistment of minors], and
her consent is necessary"); Rush v. Cobbet, 2 Yeates 275, 276 (Pa. 1798) (stating that "the terms"
of the federal removal statute "cannot be complied with"); Thompson v. Kendrick's Lessee, 6
Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 113, 115 (1818) (interpreting in summary fashion the meaning of federal
removal statute in way that "would seem more reasonable and agreeable to the words of the
law"); Luty v. Purdy, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 163, 166 (1811) (stating that Act of Congress prescribing
penalties for trading with Indians applied to persons who traded in Indian territories, not to
persons who traded in the territory of the United States); Warren v. Russel, 1 D. Chip. 193, 198
(Vt. 1814) (stating what "appears to be the only fair and consistent construction to be put on" the
federal law governing federal prisoners in state jails).
129. See Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. 150, 157 (N.Y. Ch. 1819) (stating that an Act of
Congress regulating the enrollment and licensing of ships was "never meant to determine the
right of property, or the use and enjoyment of it, under the laws of the states"); Aikin v. Dunlap,
16 Johns. 77, 84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819) (deeming it "plain" what section of Act of Congress
governing the collection of duties "was intended" to effect); Ex parte Mason, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 336,
337 (1809) (stating that Court was implementing what Congress "no doubt thought" in enacting
act regulating enlistments, regardless of what would have been decided at common law);
Poindexter's Ex'rs v. Barker, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 173, 173 (1802) (stating that the Full Faith and
Credit statute "was not intended to prescribe one mode only of authentication in exclusion of all
others"); Moore v. Houston, 3 Serg. & Rawle 169, 182 (Pa. 1817) (stating that it does "not appear
to be intended by the act of Congress [governing courts martial] to vest the authority in state
officers); Charleston v. Boyd, 8 S.C.L. (1 Mill) 353, 355-56 (1817) (stating what Act of Congress
governing the hospitalization of foreign seamen "intended to control"); Foster v. Taylor, 2 Tenn.
(2 Overt.) 191, 191 (1812) (stating that "the substance contemplated by the act of Congress is
attained"); Buel v. Enos, 1 Brayt. 56, 58-59 (Vt. 1820) (summarily determining the "object of
Congress" in act prescribing fines and forfeitures, but declining to give the question extensive
consideration, as the Supreme Court of the United States might review it).
130. Where a state court case employed multiple methods of analysis, this section considers
each method separately. Thus, several cases are discussed or noted in multiple sections. Where
the opinions of individual judges forming a majority were reported seriatim, this section
considers the opinion of each judge individually.
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1. Federal Statutory Language
One way in which state courts determined the meaning of
federal statutes was by analyzing statutory language. The methods of
analysis they employed largely comport with how modern textualists
define "textualism." Textualists argue that textualism is not "all about
words," as "textualism does not, and could not, assume that the words
131
of a statute will resolve every question that comes before a court."'
Rather, textualists ask how "a skilled, objectively reasonable user of
words" would have understood statutory language when the
legislature enacted it.132 To answer this question, textualists argue,
judges must know "the assumptions shared by the speakers and the
intended audience" regarding, among other things, "background legal
understandings and conventions that 'a reasonably diligent lawyer'
would bring to a statute in context."'1 3 Textualists are also willing to
consider certain external values-such as avoiding serious
constitutional questions or policies underlying clear statement rules"as long as the text will bear the necessary meaning." 13 4
The ways in which state courts worked with federal statutory
language during the first decades following ratification generally
comport with this conception of textualism. Specifically, state courts
analyzed (1) the plain or common meaning of statutory language; (2)
the legal or technical meaning of statutory language; (3) statutory
language in light of linguistic canons of construction; and (4) statutory
language in light of other statutory text.
a. Plain or Common Meaning
The most common method by which state courts interpreted
federal statutes was to give statutory language its "plain meaning" or
its meaning in "common parlance." By the late eighteenth century,
certain well known English cases described courts as bound by the
plain meaning of statutory language because of legislative
sovereignty, 135 as did certain state court cases.1 36 Bacon's 1786

131. Manning, Rules of Statutory Interpretation,supra note 6, at 1655.
132. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of OriginalIntent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 65 (1988).

133. Manning, Rules of Statutory Interpretation, supra note 6, at 1656 (quoting United
States v. O'Gilvie, 519 U.S. 79, 98 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
134. Id. at 1655.
135. See, e.g., Colehan v. Cooke, (1742) 125 Eng. Rep. 1231, 1233 (C.P.) ("When the words of
an Act are doubtful and uncertain, it is proper to inquire what was the intent of the Legislature:
but it is very dangerous for Judges to launch out too far in searching into the intent of the
Legislature, when they have expressed themselves in plain and clear words.").
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Abridgement stated as one principle of interpretation that where
statutory "Meaning is plain no Consequences are to be regarded in the
137
Construction; for this would be assuming a legislative Authority."
Three examples will suffice to illustrate how state courts interpreted
federal statutes according to their plain meaning.
In Conroy v. Warren,138 the Supreme Court of New York had to
decide whether the 1797 Act of Congress laying duties on stamped
paper required a check to be stamped. The act required "any bonds,
bills, single or penal, foreign or inland bill of exchange, promissory
note, or other note for the security of money" to be stamped. 139 In
particular, the court had to decide whether a check qualified under the
category "other note for the security of money." The court held that a
check did not qualify on grounds that "[a] check is not, in common
parlance, and in mercantile language, a note for the security of
140
money."
In Blythe v. Johns,141 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had
to decide whether a certification of bankruptcy was conclusive
evidence of a bankruptcy or merely prima facie evidence of a
bankruptcy. The act of Congress establishing a uniform federal system
of bankruptcy provided that such a certification was merely "prima
facie" evidence of a bankruptcy."1 42 In response to an argument that
the court should deem a certificate conclusive evidence, Chief Justice
be a
William Tilghman wrote that "[s]uch a construction 1would
43
violation of the plain meaning of the words" of the statute.
Finally, in Nelms v. Pugh,144 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina had to decide whether a bankruptcy, declared after a debtor
was arrested and imprisoned for more than two months, should have
effect as of the time of the arrest. The governing provision of the 1800
bankruptcy act provided that certain persons "being arrested for debt,
or having surrendered him or herself in discharge of bail, shall remain
in prison two months, or more," and that "every such person shall be
deemed and adjudged a bankrupt."1 45 The court rejected the argument
that it should interpret the act in light of English authorities

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
4 BACON, supra note 16, at 653.
3 Johns. Cas. 259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1802).
Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, §1, 1 Stat. 527, 527 (repealed 1798) (emphasis added).
Conroy, 3 Johns. Cas. at 261.
5 Binn. 247, 248 (Pa. 1812).
Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 34, 2 Stat. 19, 31 (repealed 1800).
Blythe, 5 Binn. at 249 (Tilghman, C.J.).
5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 149 (1807).
Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 1, 2 Stat. 19, 21 (repealed 1803).
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"introduced to shew that the bankruptcy is in England made to relate
back to the arrest." 146 Specifically, the court explained that the issue
before it could "only be settled by the statute itself," which declared in
terms that "the arrest and imprisonment are both necessary to
constitute the act of bankruptcy, and not that either independently of
the other shall be sufficient." 147 These are but three examples of many
cases in which state judges interpreted federal statutes according to
1 48
the common or plain meaning of statutory language.
146. Nelms, 4 N.C. (1 Mur.) at 152.

147. Id.
148. See also Stephenson v. Bannister, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 369, 370-71 (1814) (holding that
language of federal Full Faith and Credit Act, which requires certification by "the judge," does
not permit certification by "any judge") (emphasis omitted); Commonwealth v. Newcomb, 14
Mass. (13 Tyng) 394, 395 (1817) (holding that Act of Congress exempting "mariners actually
employed in the sea service" from militia duty required that person claiming exemption be
"employed in the sea service"); Van Brunt v. Schenck, 13 Johns. 414, 416 (N.Y. 1816) (explaining
that act of congress providing immunity "on account of such seizure" affords immunity "from an
action on account of the seizure," but not from "any subsequent abuse of his authority"); Ogden v.
Orr, 12 Johns. 143, 144 (N.Y. 1815) (holding that Act of Congress requiring owner of a vessel to
pay money to "consul" created no obligation to pay money to a seaman rather than to the consul);
Redmond v. Russell, 12 Johns. 153, 153-54 (N.Y. 1815) (holding that under federal removal
statute, which requires that the defendant "shall, at the time of entering his appearance in the
state Court, file a petition for removal," "[t]he entering an appearance, and filing the petition, are
to be simultaneous acts"); Hitchcock v. Aiken, 1 Cai. 460, 481 (N.Y. 1803) (Kent, J.) ('The act of
congress does not declare the record shall have the same effect, but only the same faith and
credit, and there is a manifest and essential difference between the one mode of expression and
the other."); Frew v. Graham, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 609, 609 (1817) (holding that an article was liable
to federal taxation at two stages of production because "the act is explicit" that the Act of
Congress lays a tax at two stages of production); Commonwealth v. Keeper of the Jail, 4 Serg. &
Rawle 505, 506 (Pa. 1818) ("The meaning of this provision, appears to be confined to debts, taken
in their common acceptation, created by contract between the soldier, and any other
individual."); Duffield v. Smith, 3 Serg. & Rawle 590, 594 (Pa. 1818) (Tilghman, C.J.) ("The
words of the act are, that the fine is to be determined and assessed by a court martial, and in the
present instance, the fine was determined and assessed by a court martial,so that the case falls
within the words of the law.") (emphasis added)"; Steele v. Bennett, 3 Serg. & Rawle 553, 555
(Pa. 1817) (Gibson, J.) ("By the letter of the act, the plaintiff is entitled; and I cannot agree to
give a construction against the letter, on a mere conjecture respecting the motive of
congress.. . ."); id. at 556 (Duncan, J.) ('There is no obscurity in this appropriation. Ingenuity
cannot devise ambiguity from the language used."); Commonwealth v. Holloway, 1 Serg. & Rawle
392, 395 (Pa. 1815) (explaining that "[tihis act is, in its terms, confined to vessels bound from a
port in the United States to any foreign port, or a from a port in one state to a port in any other
than an adjoining state," and that, accordingly, it "would be highly improper to be applied to
foreign vessels, with mariners shipped in foreign ports"); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 6 Binn. 266,
272 (Pa. 1814) (Tilghman, C.J.) (explaining that "when the meaning appears to be plain, it must
govern the construction"); Commonwealth v. Barker, 5 Binn. 423, 429 (Pa. 1813) (Yeates, J.)
(explaining that "words" providing for compensation of enlisted men between the ages of 18 and
45 "only relate to the compensation allowed to such officers, but do not prohibit the enlisting of
minors under the age of eighteen"); Rugan v. West, 1 Binn. 263, 269-70 (Pa. 1808) (Yeates, J.)
(reasoning that section of federal bankruptcy act "is not referable to an action of trover and
conversion... [as] [t]he words 'any debtor' exclude suits founded in tort, from the operation of
the clause; and in the interpretation of a law, we are not at liberty to drop any expressions made
use of by the lawgivers") (emphasis in original); United States v. Nicholls, 4 Yeates 251, 260-61
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b. Legal or Technical Meaning
State courts also interpreted federal statutes by discerning the
"legal" or "technical" meaning of statutory language. 149 In the 1807
case of Livermore v. Bagley, 150 for example, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts had to decide whether a transfer of the rigging
of a vessel was an act of bankruptcy under the federal bankruptcy
statute. The statute provided that a person commits an act of
bankruptcy if he or she "shall secretly convey his or her goods out of
his or her house, or conceal them to prevent their being taken in
execution, or make, or cause to be made, any fraudulent conveyance of
his or her lands or chattels ...."151 The court had to decide whether
the transfer of the rigging was a "conveyance" within the meaning of
the Act.152 The court held that it had to read the term "conveyance" in
its "technical sense" rather than in its "popular sense" because, "in
making a statute, the legislature are understood to refer themselves to
existing customs and rules; or, in other words, when using technical
153
terms, to employ them in a precise and technical sense."'
In Desbois' Case, 54 the Superior Court of Louisiana had to
determine whether, under an act of Congress, Desbois, who moved to
New Orleans in 1806, became a citizen of Louisiana and the United
States when Louisiana later was admitted as a state into the Union.
The relevant 1811 Act of Congress provided that "the inhabitants of
all that part of the territory or country ceded under the name of
Louisiana, by the treaty made at Paris... between the United States
and France. .. be, and they are hereby authorized to form for
themselves a constitution and state government."' 155 In holding that
Desbois should be considered a citizen of Louisiana and the United
States, the court sought "the meaning of the word ["inhabitants"] in
the laws and usages of the country before the passage of the act."'15 6 In
(Pa. 1805) (Brackenridge, J.) (determining that Act of Congress giving United States priority
with respect to debts did not extend to cases where a state has a lien on grounds that "[t]he word
person in common parlance does not mean a body politic, a state in its collective capacity")
(emphasis added).
149. Blackstone illustrated the legitimacy of such interpretive techniques as follows: "Thus,
when the law of England declares murder to be felony without benefit of clergy, we must resort
to the same law of England to learn what the benefit of clergy is... " 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note
16, at 60.
150. 3 Mass. (2 Tyng) 487 (1807).
151. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 1, 2 Stat. 19, 21 (repealed 1803) (emphasis added).
152. Livermore, 3 Mass. (2 Tyng) at 509-12.
153. Id. at 44.
154. 2 Mart. (o.s.) 185 (La. 1812).
155. Act of Feb. 20, 1811, ch. 21, § 1, 2 Stat. 641 (emphasis added).
156. Desbois' Case, 2 Mart. (o.s.) at 192.
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other cases as well, state courts determined the meaning of federal
1 57
statutory terms according to what the terms meant "in law."'
c.

Meaning in Light of Linguistic Presumptions

State courts also employed certain linguistic presumptions in
interpreting federal statutes. For example, in Rugan v. West, 158 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had to interpret a section of the
federal bankruptcy statute providing that "[i]n all cases where the
assignees shall prosecute any debtor of the bankrupt," certain acts
were conclusive of the bankruptcy.' 59 The question for the court was
whether this section applied to an action of trover. 160 In interpreting
the relevant provision, the court employed the maxim that a court
should not read a statute in such a way as to render any provision
meaningless. 16 1 Justice Jasper Yeates, in his opinion for the court,
explained that the words "any debtor" in the statute excluded "suits
founded in tort" on the ground that the court was "not at liberty to
62
drop any expressions made use of by the lawgivers."'
d. Meaning in Light of Other Statutory Provisions
Finally, state courts interpreted specific text of federal statutes
in light of other federal statutory provisions-another means of
discerning "the Meaning of the Makers."' 63 First, state courts
157. See Holden v. Curtis, 2 N.H. 61, 64 (1819) (interpreting the word "principles" in Act of
Congress governing patents in light of its common law meaning); Ashley v. Cornwell, 16 Va. (2
Munf.) 268, 270 (1811) (Roane, J.) ("The act of congress imposing a tax, in general terms, upon
'any charter-party,' must be taken to refer to the law-merchant to ascertain what a charter-party
is.").
158. 1 Binn. 263 (Pa. 1808).
159. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 56, 2 Stat. 19.
160. Rugan, 1 Binn. at 263-65.
161. Id. at 269-70.
162. Id. In Pesoa v. Passmore, 4 Yeates 139 (Pa. 1804), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
had to decide whether a bankrupt was legally exonerated from a creditor's demand while a
certificate of discharge was pending before a judge. In resolving this question, Justice Yeates
reasoned effectively that expressio unius est exclusio alterius: "Would the minutiae of privilege
and discharge be gone into in so many important particulars, and this point be left open for
conjecture and implication?" Id. at 140-41 (Yeates, J.).
163. Bacon's 1786 Abridgement explained that "[t]he most natural and genuine way of
construing a Statute is to construe one Part by another Part of the same Statute: For this best
expresseth the Meaning of the Makers .... " 4 BACON, supra note 16, at 643. There are many
examples of state court opinions examining state statutory text in light of other statutory text to
ascertain legislative intent. See, e.g., Ward v. Morris, 4 H. & McH. 330, 337 (Md. 1799) ('These
acts must be considered together as forming one system, and such an exposition given as will
effectuate the general intention of the Legislature, and to answer the ends of public benefit
which they had in view."); Church v. Crocker, 3 Mass. 17, 21 (1807) ("But in this, as in all other
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interpreted provisions of federal statutes in light of other provisions of
the same statute. In the 1801 case of Murray v. United Insurance
Co., 164 the Supreme Court of New York had to decide whether a vessel
was "American" for insurance purposes when a British subject had
acquired an interest in the profits of the vessel. A 1789 Act of
Congress provided in one section that to be registered as a vessel of
the United States, a vessel must "belong wholly to a citizen or citizens
thereof."165 A later section of the act provided that to obtain an
American register a person had to make an affidavit that no foreigner
was interested in the vessel or the profits to be derived from it.166 In
resolving the question whether the vessel at issue was American,
Justice James Kent explained in his opinion that "[t]he section in this
act, prescribing the form of the oath, accordingly explains and
illustrates the meaning of the other part, that the vessel must be
wholly owned by American citizens."'167 Since a foreigner had an
interest in the profits of the vessel, Kent concluded, the vessel had
"sailed without being entitled to an American register, within the true
intent and meaning of the act."168 There are several other examples of
state court cases interpreting provisions of federal statutes with
16 9
reference to other provisions of the same statute.
cases, the intention of the legislature must govern; and to this intention a literal construction of
any statute must yield; and to discover the true meaning of a statute, it is the duty of the Court
to consider other statutes made in pari materid, whether they are repealed or unrepealed.");
White v. Hunt, 6 N.J.L. 415, 417 (1798) (Kinsey, C.J.) ("[W]hen the legislature have made use of
a particular expression, and given to it a plain and precise signification, the same word, when
used in other proceedings, ought, unless the contrary appears manifestly right, to receive the
same construction. It is unreasonable to presume that the legislature intended by the same
words, to convey different ideas.").
164. 2 Johns. Cas. 168 (N.Y. 1801).
165. Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, § 1,1 Stat. 55.
166. Id. § 6.
167. Murray, 2 Johns. Cas. at 172 (Kent, J.).
168. Id.
169. See Coolidge v. Inglee, 15 Mass. (14 Tyng) 66, 67 (1818) ("Taking the two sections
together, we have no doubt that the security, required to be taken by the twenty-second section,
was meant to have reference to such damages and costs as should be adjudged pursuant to the
twenty-third section."); Cotel v. Hilliard, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 664, 667-68 (1808) ("To suppose that
the forfeiture expressed in the fifth section includes a desertion before the commencement of the
voyage, the case which is provided for in the second section... is to suppose that the legislature
in the same act has provided two distinct and unequal forfeitures for the same
delinquency...."); Duffield v. Smith, 3 Serg. & Rawle 590, 595 (Pa. 1818) (Tilghman, C.J.)
(explaining, with respect to question whether Act of Congress contemplated courts-martials held
under the authority of a state governor, that "there are not wanting passages in the act, which
indicate an intention that the courts should be held by officers not subject to the orders of a state
Governor"); Blythe v. Johns, 5 Binn. 247, 249 (Pa. 1812) (Tilghman, C.J.) (explaining that "where
Congress meant the evidence to be conclusive, they have taken care to say so"); id. at 250-51
(Yeates, J.) (explaining that where Congress means the evidence to be conclusive, "they say so in
precise terms"); United States v. Nicholls, 4 Yeates 251, 258 (Pa. 1805) (Yeates, J.) (explaining,
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Second, state courts interpreted federal statutes with reference
to the provisions of other federal statutes, another recognized means of
discerning statutory meaning. 170 In Commonwealth v. Murray,171 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had to interpret an Act of Congress
authorizing a greater naval force for the United States. The second
section of the Act authorized the President "to appoint, and cause to be
engaged and employed as soon as may be, three hundred midshipmen,
three thousand six hundred able seamen, ordinary seamen and
boys .
,,172 The question before the court was whether a seventeenyear-old boy could validly contract to be a seaman when he had no
father, master, or guardian to consent to the contract being made.
Chief Justice Tilghman construed the act to allow the boy to make the
contract, in part:
because, on adverting to an act respecting the army passed 16th March 1802, I find it is
provided that "no person under the age of twenty-one years shall be enlisted by an
officer, or held in the service of the United States, without the consent of his parent,
guardian or master first had and obtained, if any he have." This proviso is altogether
omitted in the act respecting the navy ....173

For Chief Justice Tilghman, the absence of this proviso in the statute
governing the case before the court supported the conclusion that
Congress authorized the boy "to make a binding contract for engaging
174
in the service of his country."
In each of these cases, state judges discerned the meaning of
federal statutes by analyzing text that Congress enacted. This kind of
analysis was a paradigmatic way in which courts sought to discern
and implement actual legislative directives.
2. Other Sources of Law
In several cases, state courts interpreted federal statutes with
reference to English statutes or principles of the common law or law of
with respect to question whether provision in Act of Congress applied to states, that "[n]o section
or clause in any part of the act respects in the most distant manner the several states in their
political and corporate capacities"); Davis v. Hall, 10 S.C.L. 292, 294 (1818) ('The proviso, in the
act which immediately follows the above quoted clause, shows most emphatically, that the word
'persons' therein mentioned was not intended to exclude the right of such children ...").
170. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at 60 (describing "the comparison of a law with other
laws, that are made by the same legislator" as a means of discerning statutory meaning).
171. 4 Binn. 487 (Pa. 1812).
172. Act of Jan. 31, 1809, ch. 11, § 2, 2 Stat. 514.
173. Murray, 4 Binn. at 492-93 (Tilghman, C.J.).
174. Id. at 493. For another example of a state court interpreting a federal statute with
reference to another federal statute, see United States v. Nicolls, 4 Yeates 251, 259 (Pa. 1805)
(Yeates, J.) ("The regulations and provisions in the bankrupt act of congress of 4th April 1800,
strongly fortify in my mind the construction I have made of the act of 3d March 1797.").
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nations. In these cases, one might expect to find examples of state
courts "equitably" interpreting federal statutes that did not
comfortably comport with familiar legal traditions. An examination of
these cases reveals, however, that state courts did not purport to
consult such sources as a means of shaping statutes to accord with
reason; rather, in each instance in which a state court interpreted a
federal statute with reference to an English statute or the law of
nations, it made clear that the import of consulting such sources was
to discern the intent of Congress. The theory was that Congress, in
enacting a statute, understood itself to be referring to existing
customs and rules.
a. Meaning in Light of English Statutes
Conroy v. Warren, discussed above, provides an example of a
state court interpreting the meaning of a federal statute in light of an
English statute. 175 In Conroy, the Supreme Court of New York
referred to the English stamp act in interpreting the American stamp
act. 176 The court, as explained, had to resolve whether the 1797 Act of
Congress laying duties on stamped paper required a check to be
stamped. After examining the language of the Act in light of common
parlance and mercantile usage, the court observed that "[i]n the
English stamp act, checks, drafts, and orders, are particularly
mentioned ... ,"177 This, the Court explained, "affords a strong
presumption that they were not intended to be included in the act of
congress."1 78 The reason was that the English statute evidenced a
"usage and practice" that Congress was understood to comprehend,
and that, accordingly, could "afford an exposition of the construction of
1 79
the statute."

175. 3 Johns. Cas. 259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1802).
176. In his Commentaries, Blackstone described "the comparison of a law with other laws...
that have some affinity with the subject, or that expressly relate to the same point" as a valid
means of discerning statutory meaning. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at 60.
177. Conroy, 3 Johns. Cas. at 261 (emphasis added).
178. Id. (emphasis added).
179. Id. See also Livermore v. Bagley, 3 Mass. 487, 510 (1807) (explaining that "in making a
statute, the legislature are understood to refer themselves to existing customs and rules," and
that "[iun this respect the variance from the British statute operates against the construction
contended for by the plaintiff'). Cf. Holden v. Curtis, 2 N.H. 61, 63 (1819) (explaining that the
statute's "language resembles that in most statutes, concerning the record of deeds of real estate"
and "[w]e see no reason against an adoption of the same rule under the act of Congress"); Rugan
v. West, 1 Binn. 263, 270-71 (Pa. 1808) ("The resolutions under the British acts of bankruptcy
throw no light on the present question" as "[t]hey vary in point of expression from our statute, as
far as relates to the subject under consideration.") (emphasis added).
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b. Meaning in Light of Principlesof the Common Law or Law of
Nations
In a few cases, state courts referred to the common law or law
of nations in interpreting acts of Congress. English treatises and
digests addressing statutory interpretation all recited in one form or
another the principle that courts should interpret obscure statutes to
accord with the common law.180 Stated differently, the principle was
that courts should not interpret statutes to be in derogation of the
common law unless the statute derogated from it by express
language.1 8 ' This principle could suggest one of two things: one, that
courts should make obscure statutes accord with the reason of the
common law without regard for anything that the legislature may
have intended, or two, that courts should make obscure statutes
accord with the reason of the common law because legislatures, in
enacting general language, intended such language to comport with
the common law. In each case in which a state court invoked the
common law or the law of nations in interpreting a federal statute, the
court made clear that it was doing so as a means of discerning
congressional intent. In other words, state courts presumed that
Congress was aware of this interpretive principle and thus would use
express language when it meant to displace a common law right.
8 2 the Supreme
For example, in Commonwealth v. Cushing,1
Judicial Court of Massachusetts had to interpret a section of the 1813
Act of Congress governing army enlistments. The statute provided
that "no person under the age of twenty-one years, shall be
enlisted.. . without the consent, in writing, of his parent, guardian, or
master, first had and obtained, if any he have ....,"183The question
before the court was whether a minor who had no parent, guardian, or
master could bind himself to an enlistment. The court interpreted the
statute to prohibit such enlistments. Among other reasons, the court
explained that "[i]nfants are, by the common law, incapable of making
any contract binding on themselves, except in a very few instances....
The legislature ought not lightly to be presumed, in any case, thus to
8 4
violate a fundamental principle of the common law."'
180. See, e.g., 4 BACON, supra note 16, at 647 ("An obscure Statute ought to be considered
according to the Rules of the Common Law."); 19 VINER, supra note 15, at 520 ("Obscure statutes
ought to be interpreted according to the rules of the common law.").
181. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at 89 (describing this principle).
182. 11 Mass. 67 (1814).
183. Act of Jan. 20, 1813, ch. 12, § 5, 2 Stat. 791, 792.
184. Cushing, 11 Mass. at 70; see also Champneys v. Lyle, 1 Binn. 327, 331-32 (Pa. 1808)
(Tilghman, C.J.) ("It would have been an act of such extreme injustice to take away from sureties
in custom-house bonds, that preference which had been assured to them ...that nothing but the
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A related principle of interpretation derived from the law of
nations-indeed, "a maxim of political law"-was that "sovereign
states," like individuals, "cannot be deprived of any of their rights by
implication . ."185 In United States v. Nicholls, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania invoked this maxim in holding that a federal statute
giving the United States a preference with respect to certain debts did
not apply to cases in which a state was a creditor. After reciting the
maxim, Justice Yeates explained that "[i]t would certainly require
strong, clear, marked expressions, to satisfy a reasonable mind, that
the constituted authorities of the union contemplated by any public
law, the devesting of any pre-existing right or interest in a
"186
state .
In each of these cases, a state court referred to the common
law, the law of nations, or an English statute for the stated purpose of
discerning and implementing congressional intent.
".

3. Purposes and Consequences
Finally, there are several cases in which a state court
interpreted a federal statute with reference to the purpose of the
statute or to the consequences of ascribing to it a particular meaning.
As explained in Part I, these were commonly employed means of
discerning statutory meaning in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. 8 7 These means could be part and parcel of a
reason-based
"equitable interpretation," or an interpretation
meaningfully geared toward implementing legislative intent. As
explained, English cases, digests, and treatises, as well as American
state courts, variously justified such means of interpretation as
rectifying statutes with the demands of reason, or as implementing

clearest expressions could induce me to suppose that congress had such intention."); see also
Livingston v. Livingston, 2 Cai. 300, 301 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (explaining, after reading one
provision of a federal statute in light of another to determine its "true construction," that "[i]t
would require express words to take a party's pre-existing rights").
185. United States v. Nicholls, 4 Yeates 251, 258 (Pa. 1805) (Yeates, J.).
186. Id. (emphasis added).
187. Regarding statutory purpose, see 4 BACON, supra note 16, at 648 ("The Intention of the
Makers of a Statute is at sometimes to be collected from the Cause or Necessity of making a
Statute; at other Times from other Circumstances."); 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at 61 ("[T]he
most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are
dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it; or the cause which moved the legislator to
enact it."). Regarding the consequences of particular statutory interpretations, see 4 BACON,
supra note 16, at 652 ("If the Meaning of a statute be doubtful, the Consequences are be
considered in the Construction .. "); 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at 60 ("As to the effects and
consequence, the rule is, where the words bear either none, or a very absurd signification, if
literally understood, we must a little deviate from the received sense of them.").
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legislative intent, real or presumed.1 81 American state courts, in
interpreting federal statutes, employed these means of interpretation
either in support of textual analyses or as a means of otherwise
implementing actual legislative intent, not to implement independent
dictates of reason or equity.
In the overwhelming majority of cases in which state courts
examined the purposes of federal statutes or the consequences of
ascribing a particular meaning to a federal statute, they did so simply
to confirm independent textual statutory analyses. Even state judges
who believed that courts should interpret statutes according to the
plain import of their language often explained how applying the letter
served interests of reason and convenience. In Hardin v. Owings,8 9
Kentucky Chief Justice Edwards, after protesting at length that
ultimately judges should make "acts of the legislature, according to
their plain and obvious import ... the proper and governing rule of

decision," observed that "[i]ndependent, however, of the binding and
obligatory force of the act itself, whether it is wise or unwise; the rule
it furnishes appears to be founded in reason, in convenience, and is
justified by sound policy."' 190 In interpreting federal statutes, several
state courts followed textual analyses with a statement that the text
served the reason of the law or avoided bad consequences of another
interpretation.
In the 1818 Pennsylvania case Commonwealth v. Keeper of the
Jail,'91 for example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania discussed the
reason that Congress enacted a statute to confirm a textual analysis of
it. An 1802 act of Congress provided "[tihat no non-commissioned
officer, musician or private shall be arrested, or subject to arrest, or to
be taken in execution for any debt under the sum of twenty dollars,
contracted before enlistment, nor for any debt contracted after
enlistment."'192 The court had to decide whether this act shielded a
soldier from having to answer to the charge of deserting his wife and
children, leaving them without support. The court read the statutory
language according to its meaning in common parlance, specifically, to
extend only "to debts, taken in their common acceptation, created by
contract between the soldier and any other individual."'193 The court
proceeded to explain that "there was great reason" for Congress to
prevent arrests only in the case of such debts: if Congress permitted
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See supra Part L.A-B.
4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 214 (1808).
Id. at 216-17.
4 Serg. & Rawle 505 (Pa. 1818).
Act of Mar. 16, 1802, ch. 9, § 23, 2 Stat. 132, 136-37 (emphasis added).
Keeper of the Jail, 4 Serg. & Rawle at 506 (emphasis added).
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arrests on contractual debts, "every soldier might be withdrawn from
the army, by contracting a debt for that purpose." 194 Congress, the
court continued, could not have "intended to prevent arrests in all
cases of debt," including one that arose from a soldier's desertion of his
family. 195 In several other cases, state courts similarly explained
96
statutory purposes to support their readings of statutory language.
197
The 1817 North Carolina case Frew v. Graham, provides an
example of how, in some cases, state courts supported textual analyses
of federal statutes by noting the consequences of ascribing another
meaning to the statute. An 1815 Act of Congress imposed duties upon
a long list of goods, including one dollar per ton on "pig iron" and "bar
iron."'198 The question for the Supreme Court of North Carolina was
whether a person who made pig iron in his own furnace, and then
worked it into bar iron at his own forge, was responsible for a duty at
each stage of production. 199 The court determined that "the act is
explicit" that "a distinct tax is laid upon the manufacture of iron in its
two stages of pigs and bars."200 Under the statute, the court explained,
"it is the article, and not the manufacturer, that pays." 20 1 The court
then proceeded to note the consequences of a contrary interpretation:
"And it would seem strange, when the owner of a furnace makes pigs,
one half of which he sells to a neighboring owner of a forge, to be made
into bar iron, and the other half is manufactured into bars at his own
forge, that in the former case two dollars should be paid per ton, and

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Commonwealth v. Newcomb, 14 Mass. (13 Tyng) 394, 396 (1817) (explaining the
"reason" for what the language of the act requires); Van Brunt v. Schenck, 13 Johns. 414, 417
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816) (supporting textual analysis with examination of "[tihe object which this act
of congress had in view"); Ogden v. Orr, 12 Johns. 143, 145 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815) (describing "the
policy of' what the language of "[tihe act directs"); Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. 69, 72 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1813) (explaining that a doctrine contrary to "the evident construction of the act of
congress ... would be repugnant to sound policy"); Murray v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns Cas. 168,
172-3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1801) (Kent, J.) (explaining that construction contrary to text and "true
intent and meaning of the act" would also be "contrary to the policy of our statute");
Commonwealth v. Barker, 5 Binn. 423, 429 (Pa. 1813) (Yeates, J.) (explaining that facts of case
are "within the words and spirit of the act of congress"); Commonwealth v. Holloway, 5 Binn.
512, 515 (Pa. 1813) (explaining that there is "great reason" for what "appears to us to be the fair
and genuine construction of the act of congress"); Blythe v. Johns, 5 Binn. 247, 249 (Pa. 1812)
(Tilghman, C.J.) (explaining that "plain meaning" construction "accords with the spirit of the act
of Congress").
197. 4 N.C. (Taylor) 609 (1817).
198. Act of Jan. 18, 1815, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 180 (repealed 1816).
199. Frew, 4 N.C. (Taylor) at 609.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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in the latter, only one" '20 2 In other cases as well, courts noted how good
consequences would follow from textual interpretations, or how bad
consequences that would follow from textual interpretations were
20 3
Congress's responsibility.
In some cases, state courts examined statutory purposes as an
independent means of determining statutory meaning. If there are
instances of state courts interpreting federal statutes without regard
for actual legislative directives, they should, if anywhere, be found
here. In each of these cases, however, the state court examined the
purpose of the statute in order to determine what Congress intended.
The 1803 New York case of Jenks v. Hallet20 4 provides an
interesting example. In 1798, Congress enacted the Non-Intercourse
Act, which prohibited commercial intercourse with France and her
dependencies. 20 5 In Jenks, the sloop Nancy, on a voyage from Newport,
Rhode Island to Havana, was forced by distress to land at CapeFrangois in Hispaniola, a French possession. 20 6 There, French officials
seized some of the ship's cargo, and permitted the captain to sell the
rest. 20 7 As payment, the Nancy took on and sailed with produce from
Hispaniola. 20 8 An issue in the case was whether the Nancy violated

202. Id. at 609-10.
203. See Stephenson v. Bannister, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 369, 370-71 (1814) (examining "[t]he only
inconvenience that results" from "the correct construction of the act"); Coolidge v. Inglee, 15
Mass. (Tyng) 66, 68 (1818) (explaining that in light of textual interpretation of act, bad
consequences of statutory meaning were Congress's responsibility); Livermore v. Bagley, 3 Mass.
(2 Tyng) 487, 511 (1807) (explaining that "[tihe popular sense of a term, in opposition to the
technical, is not to be adopted, where manifest inconveniences would be incurred"); Thurber v.
Blackbourne, 1 N.H. 242, 245 (1818) (explaining that "these supposed consequences do not result
from the construction we give to the words of the act," which reflects what act "intended");
Bartlett v. Wyman, 14 Johns. 260, 262 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817) (explaining that argued construction
of act would be "not only against the plain intention of the statute," but would also produce bad
consequences); Frew v. Graham, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 609, 609 (1817) (explaining how construction
contrary to "explicit" meaning of act would produce "strange" consequences); Duffield v. Smith, 3
Serg. & Rawle 590, 595 (Pa. 1818) (Tilghman, C.J.) (supporting textual interpretation by noting
that "very inconvenient consequences might follow" from another interpretation);
Commonwealth v. Murray, 4 Binn. 487, 493 (Pa. 1812) (Tilghman, C.J.) ("Such intention is
entirely consistent with the words of the law, may be productive of good consequences, and is
attended with no evil."); Rugan v. West, 1 Binn. 263, 271-72 (Pa. 1808) (explaining how counter
textual interpretation would be "inconvenient"); Pesoa v. Passmore, 4 Yeates 139, 140-41 (Pa.
1804) (Yeates, J.) (explaining that certain consequences do not undermine the "intention" evident
from textual analysis); Respublica v. Nicholson, 2 Yeates 9, 14-15 (Pa. 1795) (observing that
consequences of counter textual interpretation of act of Congress "could never have been the
intention" of Congress).
204. 1 Cai. 60 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803), aff'd 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 210 (1805).
205. Act of June 13, 1798, ch. 53, 1 Stat. 565.
206. Jenks, 1 Cai. At 60.
207. Id. at 61.
208. Id.
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the Non-Intercourse Act by taking on and sailing with this cargo.20 9
210 It
The court held the Act inapplicable to the Nancy's actions.
explained that the acts of the Nancy were "acts of necessity and
coercion, and the laws of congress which suspended the commercial
intercourse with France and her dependencies, cannot reasonably be
construed to apply to a case of this description."211 The "object" of the
Act, the court explained, "was to prevent an intentional or voluntary
traffic, and not to compel a sacrifice of property, or inflict a penalty in
cases of distress or necessity." 21 2 The court concluded that construing
the Act to inflict a penalty in such cases of distress would be
"excessively severe" and contrary to the "intent" of Congress. 21 3
In Hammon v. Smith, 214 the Constitutional Court of Appeals of
South Carolina had to decide whether, under the federal full faith and
credit act, one state had to give the same effect to the judicial
proceedings of another state as would that other state. 21 5 The Act
provided in relevant part that properly authenticated "records and
judicial proceedings ...shall have such faith and credit given to them
in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage
in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be
taken."2 16 The plaintiff argued that state courts only had to regard a
judgment of the courts of another state as they would regard
judgments from the courts of foreign nations. 2 17 Judge Joseph Brevard
explained, in response to this position, that he was "unable to perceive
any other object or purpose the act of congress is calculated to answer,
or any other meaning it can have," but to reject the plaintiffs
position. 21 8 Indeed, he explained, "[U]nless the construction I give this
act of congress, should prevail, it must be idle and vain."21 9 There are
a few other examples of state courts identifying statutory purposes as
220
a means of discerning congressional intent.
209. Id. at 64.
210. Id. at 65.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 110 (1802).
215. Id. at 110-11.
216. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122.
217. Hammon, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) at 110.
218. Id. at 112 (Brevard, J.).
219. Id.
220. See Manchester v. Boston, 16 Mass. (Tyng) 230, 235 (1819) (stating, in dicta, what a
statutory term "must be understood to intend" with reference to what "[w]ithout doubt, the object
of Congress, in making this provision, was"); Oliver v. Smith, 5 Mass. (4 Tyng) 183, 189-91 (1809)
(determining the "true construction of the act of Congress" by recognizing that under another
proffered construction "the intentions of the act could not be carried into effect" and that it was
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In only one state court case interpreting a federal statute did a
judge follow the "spirit" as opposed to the "words" of the statute
without specifically noting that the decision was giving effect to
221
congressional intent. In Commonwealth ex rel. Menges v. Camac,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had to interpret the 1813 Act of
Congress providing "that no person under the age of twenty-one years
shall be enlisted by any officer, or held in the service of the United
States, without the consent, in writing, of his parent, guardian or
master first had and obtained." 222 The question in the case was
whether a minor who enlisted without the consent of his father, but
whose father consented five or six days after the enlistment, was
bound by the enlistment. 223 Chief Justice Tilghman concluded in his
opinion that the minor was bound to the enlistment for the following
reason: "The case is within the words, but not within the spirit of the
law, which I take to be this: that no minor shall be detained without
the consent of his parent."224 Since the parent had given consent,
225
Tilghman concluded that the minor was bound.
It is unlikely that, in ruling in this way, Tilghman understood
himself to be implementing a spirit of reason contrary to or in
disregard of congressional intent. In opinions interpreting
Pennsylvania state statutes according to statutory "objects" rather
than statutory letter, Tilghman made clear that he was seeking to
implement real objects of the state legislature. In 1811, he explained
that "[a]s to the construction of statutes, it is certain they are not
always to be construed according to the letter. General expressions
may be restrained, where it clearly appears from the whole law, that it
was the intention of the legislature to provide a remedy only for
particular cases. ' 226 Indeed, he wrote "[t]he intention must be clear to
"impossible to suppose that Congress" should be indifferent to matters bearing on the
effectiveness of the act); Redmond v. Russell, 12 Johns. 153, 154 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815)
(determining whether putting in special bail in state court was an "appearance" under federal
removal statute on the basis of (1) what Congress "intended" in requiring that a removal petition
be filed at the time of appearance and (2) certain facts of which it supposed Congress was
"aware"); cf. Redmond, 12 Johns. at 155 (Thompson, C.J., dissenting) (interpreting "appearance"
in removal statute in light of other provisions of the removal statute).
221. 1 Serg. & Rawle 87 (Pa. 1814).
222. Act of Jan. 20, 1813, ch. 12, § 5, 2 Stat. 791, 792.
223. Camac, 1 Serg. & Rawle at 88-89.
224. Id. at 89 (Tilghman, C.J.).
225. Id.
226. Bank of N. Am. v. Fitzsimons, 3 Binn 342, 356-57 (Pa. 1811) (Tilghman, C.J.); see also
Comm'rs of Allegheny County v. Lecky, 6 Serg. & Rawle 166, 168 (Pa. 1820) ("It has been said for
the defendants, that this being a special authority, it should be construed strictly; on the
contrary, I think that the object being to grant power to do a work beneficial to the county of
Allegheny, the act of assembly should be construed liberally for the attainment of its object .... ")
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authorize the restraining of the enacting clauses." 2 27 Such opinions
invoked the principle that, to give effect to the "Intention of the
Makers of a Statute," courts should give effect to "the Cause or
Necessity of making a Statute," even though "such Construction seem
contrary to the Letter of the Statute." 228 Tilghman refused to
implement the spirit as opposed to the words of an act when he
determined that the words best reflected legislative intent. In Crescoe
v. Laidley,229 for example, Tilghman refused "to supply the omissions
of the acts, by inserting what we may suppose to have been intended
by the legislature" on the ground that the legislature must have
''examined with great attention" the state of the law before enacting
the statute in question and made "every alteration ... which was
thought necessary." 230
4. Tentative Observations
The point of this analysis is that state judges interpreted
federal statutes during the first three decades following ratification in
ways geared toward implementing legislative directives. In not one
case did a state court invoke the equity of the statute doctrine in
interpreting a federal statute or otherwise expressly profess to be
equitably interpreting one. Rather, state courts most often interpreted
federal statutes according to the import of statutory language, a
means understood to be geared toward the implementation of actual
legislative directives. Where state courts employed less text-focused
means of statutory interpretation (for example, by examining
purposes or consequences), they did so either to support independent
textual analyses or for the stated purpose of giving effect to
congressional intent.
None of this is to deny that the concept of legislative intent,
real or presumed, is one fraught with difficulties, nor that a court may
say that it is pursuing legislative intent but in fact be pursuing other
objectives, consciously or subconsciously. In determining what state
courts historically understood their proper role to be in interpreting
federal statutes, the germane fact is what state courts professedly
(emphasis added); Lyons v. Miller, 4 Serg. & Rawle 279, 280 (Pa. 1818) ("But to say, that this act
of assembly, which was manifestly intended to promote justice, and to prevent the sacrifice of
substance to form, should be so construed as to uphold form at the expense of substance, would
be to defeat its object, and convert that into a mischief which was designed for a remedy.")
(emphasis added).
227. Fitzsimons, 3 Binn. at 359 (Tilghman, C.J.).
228. 4 BACON, supra note 16, at 648.
229. 2 Binn. 279 (Pa. 1810).
230. Id. at 286.
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understood their role to be, not that in certain cases they really acted
contrary to that understanding (because they subordinated legislative
intent to other designs, or because in some cases pursuing legislative
intent was a practical impossibility). It suffices for present purposes to
observe that state courts generally understood their proper role in
interpreting federal statutes to be that of discerning and enforcing the
directives of Congress. How courts can best fulfill this role, and how
helpful the concept of legislative intent is to answering this question,
is beyond the scope of this Article. The point for now is that state
courts did not manifest an understanding that their role in
interpreting federal statutes was to act as agents of "We the People of
the United States," empowered to make federal law accord with
reason or policy in forward-looking ways without regard for
discernable expectations of Congress.
B. Why State Courts Did Not Make Reason-Based Equitable
Interpretationsof Federal Statutes
This Section suggests a possible explanation of why state
courts did not make the kind of reason-based equitable interpretations
of federal statutes that they sometimes made of state statutes. As
explained in Part I, there was movement on the part of some (perhaps
a predominance of) English and American state judges at the time of
the American Founding toward interpretive principles understood to
implement the law as made by the legislator. One theory behind this
movement, as explained, was respect for legislative supremacy. If the
supremacy of state legislatures was a disputed matter among some
state judges, the supremacy of Congress when it properly exercised its
enumerated powers under the Constitution may have been deemed
indisputable in light of the Supremacy Clause. The Supremacy Clause
provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
231
Contrary notwithstanding.

The Supremacy Clause has two implications for the
interpretation of federal statutes by state courts. First, the Supremacy
Clause references federal lawmaking procedures that state courts
would jettison if they interpreted federal statutes in ways selfconsciously designed to make or develop new federal law. The

231. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Supremacy Clause provides that "the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof' constitute "the supreme Law of
the Land.'232 For each category of federal law that the Supremacy
Clause references, the Constitution provides a specific lawmaking
procedure. 233 The Constitution became federal law by "the Ratification
of the Conventions of nine States,"234 with amendments to become law
by proposal of two thirds of both houses of Congress and ratification
by three fourths of the states. 235 A federal statute becomes law after
the House of Representatives and the Senate have passed it, and the
President has signed it.236 A treaty becomes law after the President
has made it, and the Senate has ratified it.237 The Supremacy Clause
expressly provides that state judges shall be bound by federal laws
made pursuant to these procedures, including acts of Congress.
Professor Brad Clark has argued that in light of the text,
structure, and history of the Constitution, the lawmaking procedures
that the Constitution specifies for the "Constitution," "Laws," and
"Treaties" of the United States to become law are the exclusive means
by which government actors may make the federal "supreme Law of
the Land."238 On this theory, for state courts to self-consciously
interpret federal statutes to make new federal law in forward-looking
ways would jettison the specific procedures by which the Constitution
provides that new federal law may be made. It is possible that, on this
understanding, state courts more uniformly strove to interpret federal
statutes to implement actual legislative directives than they strove to
interpret state statutes.
The second implication of the Supremacy Clause for the
interpretation of federal statutes by state courts is that "supremacy"
characterizes a valid form of federal law. For a state court to interpret
a federal statute in such a way as to self-consciously make "new"
policy for the Union would be to deny to law so made such supremacy.
By rendering federal law "the supreme Law of the Land," the
Supremacy Clause fairly implies that a federal law, by its nature,
means the same thing in one state as it means in another. 239 John Jay
232. Id. (emphasis added).
233. For an analysis of the Supremacy Clause and federal lawmaking procedures as they
relate to concepts of separation of powers and federalism, see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of
Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism,79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001).

234. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
235. Id. art. V.
236. Id. art. I, § 7.
237. Id. art. II, § 2.
238. Clark, supra note 233, at 1331-72.
239. This does not mean that federal law may not govern activities in only one state. A
federal law provides, for example, that a portion of a canal "located in the City of Buffalo, State
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made this point in April 1787, just months before the Federal
Convention commenced. Under the Articles of Confederation, certain
states notoriously "interpreted" the 1783 Treaty of Paris, ending the
American Revolutionary War, in ways that contradicted its clear and
specific meaning. In March 1787, the Continental Congress passed a
resolution recommending that, in all cases "arising from or touching
the said treaty," state courts "shall decide and adjudge according to
the true intent and meaning of the same, any thing in the said acts or
parts of acts to the contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding. ''240
In support of this resolution, John Jay argued that it is "irrational"
that "the same Article of the same treaty might by law be made to
mean one thing in New Hampshire, another thing in New York, and
neither the one nor the other of them in Georgia. '24 1 The recognized
purpose of the Clause during ratification debates was to prevent a
"part" from controlling the "whole."242 Absent the dictate of the
of New York, is declared to be a nonnavigable waterway of the United States." 33 U.S.C. § 59q- 1
(2000). A law may govern activities in only one state and still be the law of the land. Indeed, it is
the law not only in Buffalo but also in the United States as a whole that this canal in Buffalo is a
nonnavigable waterway. Federal laws imposing obligations in a particular state are common, as
is state participation in the development of such state-specific federal law. It would be irrational
for federal law in New York to be that this particular canal in Buffalo is nonnavigable but in
Pennsylvania to be that this particular canal in Buffalo is navigable. The supreme law of the
land cannot be both.
240. Resolution of Continental Congress, Mar. 21, 1787, reprinted in 32 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 125 (Roscoe R. Hill ed.) (emphasis added). This
language-"true intent and meaning"-was familiar not only from its use in judicial decisions
interpreting statutory language, but also from its use in instruments defining the power of
governing bodies. For example, the charters of several colonies variously provided that governing
authorities or individuals were to act according to the "true intent and meaning' of laws to which
they were subject. See, e.g., Connecticut Charter of 1662, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 252,

255 (2d ed., 1878) (providing that various forms of law "as shall be so made by the Governor,
Deputy-Governor, and Assistants... shall carefully and duly be observed, kept, performed, and
put in Execution, according to the true Intent and Meaning of the same"); Delaware Charter of
1701, reprinted in 1 id. at 270, 272 (providing that "no Act, Law or Ordinance whatsoever, shall
at any Time hereafter, be made or done, to alter, change or diminish the Form or Effect of this
Charter, or of any Part or Clause therein, contrary to the true intent and Meaning thereof");
Rhode Island Charter of 1663, reprinted in 1 id. at 1595, 1599 (providing that certain forms of
law "shall bee carefully and duely observed, kept, performed and putt in execution, accordinge to
the true intent and meaning of the same"). The apparent purpose of such provisions was to keep
governing authorities and individuals in the colonies from disregarding laws to which they were
subject. Along these lines, James Madison explained in The Federalist No. 44 that if Congress
exceeded its powers as warranted by the "true meaning" of the Constitution, the people should
have redress for that usurpation of authority. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 305 (James Madison)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
241. John Jay, Continental Congress (Apr. 13, 1787), in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION
589, 590 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
242. In the North Carolina ratifying convention, for example, William McClaine argued with
reference to the Supremacy Clause as follows: "Shall a part control the whole? To permit the
local laws of any state to control the laws of the Union, would be to give the general government
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Supremacy Clause, as James Madison put it, "the world would have
seen ... the authority of the whole society every where subordinate to
the authority of the parts; it would have seen a monster, in which the
243
head was under the direction of the members."
A state court that made "new" federal law in a forward-looking
way in interpreting a federal statute would be purporting to make "the
supreme Law of the Land" only if it employed the same normative
metric for determining what that law should be as every other court
reasonably would employ in the same circumstances. Dynamic
theories of interpretation, however, suggest that judges are justified in
making law on the basis of the kinds of strategic considerations that
can move a legislature to make new law. Unless such considerations
claim to be the considerations upon which a court must act and claim
to necessarily lead to the law a court has made, a state court acting
pursuant to such considerations would not be making law that
meaningfully was operational as the supreme law of the land.
On the other hand, when state courts historically sought to
implement actual legislative directives, they purported to employ a
metric that every other court, state or federal, should employ if
interpreting the same statute in the same context. This is not to say
that courts seeking to implement actual legislative directives have
always settled upon the same interpretation of a statute. They may
dispute, for example, whether a textual or purposive methodology is
best geared toward implementing what the legislature has enacted. If
they employ a textual methodology, they may dispute the reasonable
import of words. If they employ a purposive methodology, they may
dispute the appropriate level of generality at which to discern a
purpose. In such cases, judges may "make" law in a real sense, but in
a different sense than they make law when they purport to act as a
deputy legislature or legislative partner in the strategic making of
federal law. In attempting to discern actual legislative directives, a
judge may make law as a consequence of attempting to enforce the
no powers at all. If the judges are not to be bound by it, the powers of Congress will be nugatory.
This is self-evident and plain." 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE

ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 181 (Jonathan Elliot & Burt Franklin eds., 2d ed.
1888). Governor Samuel Johnston similarly argued in the North Carolina ratifying convention
that "[t]he laws made in pursuance thereof by Congress ought to be the supreme law of the land;
otherwise, any one state might repeal the laws of the Union at large. Without this clause, the
whole Constitution would be a piece of blank paper." Id. at 187-88.
243. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison). More than forty years later, James Madison

would write that it was to protect the "authority of the whole" from "the parts separately and
independently" that "dictated the clause declaring that the Constitution & laws of the U.S.
should be the supreme law of the Land, anything in the constn or laws of any of the States to the
contrary notwithstanding." James Madison, Notes on Nullification (1835-36), in 4 FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 241, at 632.
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dictates of existing law. This kind of lawmaking is inevitable given the
limitations of language and the "open texture" of law. When a state
judge "makes" federal law in this way, the judge attempts to discern
and apply the federal rule of decision that every court should apply in
the same case-a rule that purports to be the "supreme Law of the
Land." In contrast, when a state judge self-consciously makes federal
law in a strategic way, the judge fails to employ an interpretive metric
that all state and federal judges could reasonably be expected to
employ, and thereby cannot purport to be making "federal" law that
has the quality of being the "supreme Law of the Land." It is possible
that, on this understanding, state courts more uniformly strove to
interpret federal statutes to implement actual legislative directives
than they strove to interpret state statutes.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL STATUTES BY
FEDERAL COURTS

This Part tentatively examines the implications of this analysis
for the historical debate over how federal courts should interpret
federal statutes. At first glance, it might appear that this analysis has
no implications for the interpretation of federal statutes by federal
courts. If the propriety of the interpretive methodology that a court
employs depends on the identity of the interpreter, it might be argued
that the Article III "judicial power" of federal courts is to act as
''cooperative partners" with Congress in the making of federal law,
while, under the Supremacy Clause, the duty of state courts is to act
as Congress's faithful agents. Indeed, it might be argued that just as
state courts historically interpreted "their own" statutes "more freely"
than they interpreted federal statutes, federal courts may interpret
"their own" statutes "more freely" than state courts. In the American
constitutional structure, however, the propriety of different methods of
interpretation is not solely a function of the "judicial power" of federal
courts. Rather, the Supremacy Clause and the lawmaking procedures
that it references have implications for statutory interpretation by
federal courts as well as state courts.
First, if the procedures by which the Constitution provides that
federal law may be made are the exclusive means by which
government actors may self-consciously make federal law in strategic,
forward-looking ways, those procedures limit the lawmaking authority
of federal courts to the same extent that they limit the lawmaking
authority of state courts. When state courts recognize the exclusivity
of these procedures, they respect the supremacy of federal law in its
proper domain. When federal courts recognize the exclusivity of these
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procedures, they respect state authority to govern in areas in which no
validly enacted federal law precludes or preempts state governance.
As Brad Clark has argued, "Although federal lawmaking procedures
are generally regarded as 'integral parts of the constitutional design
for the separation of powers,' they also preserve federalism both by
making federal law more difficult to adopt, and by assigning
lawmaking power solely to actors subject to the political safeguards of
federalism. '244 In particular, Clark points out, the Constitution calls
for the participation of the Senate, "the federal institution in which
the states had the greatest influence," 24 5 in the making of all forms of
federal law. "Permitting the federal government to avoid these
constraints," Clark argues, "would allow it to exercise more power
than the Constitution contemplates, at the expense of state
authority. '246 Accordingly, the exclusivity of federal lawmaking
procedures that would restrain the authority of state courts to make
federal law in order to protect the lawmaking prerogatives of proper
federal authorities would also restrain the authority of federal courts
to make federal law in order to protect the lawmaking prerogatives of
proper state authorities.
Second, for inferior federal courts strategically to make federal
law in forward-looking ways in statutory interpretation would deny
the law so made the characteristic of being "the supreme Law of the
Land." The Supremacy Clause's characterization of federal law as the
"supreme Law of the Land, '247 fairly implies that at an appropriate
level of generality federal law should have a uniform meaning in any
state or federal court. 24 8 During ratification debates, various actors
pointed out that a reason the Constitution established a federal
judiciary was to maintain uniformity in the interpretation of federal
laws. Most prominently, Alexander Hamilton argued in The Federalist
mere
No. 80 that there should be federal courts based upon "the
249
laws."
national
of
interpretation
the
in
necessity of uniformity
The Supreme Court has long recognized that federal statutes
should have a uniform meaning in state and federal courts, even in
the first instance, in cases addressing the obligation of state courts to
244. Clark, supranote 233, at 1324 (quoting Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938)).
245. Id. at 1342-43.
246. Id. at 1324.
247. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
248. See supra notes 239-43 and accompanying text.
249. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). For
another example, see A Landholder V, reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 483 (Merrill Jenson ed., 1978) ("A perfect uniformity must
be observed thro the whole Union, or jealousy and unrighteousness will take place, and for a
uniformity, one judiciary must pervade the whole.").
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apply federal common law or to enforce certain federal procedural
requirements. In the 1952 decision of Dice v. Akron, Canton &
Youngstown Railroad Co., 250 for example, the Court addressed
whether a state court should apply state law or federal common law to
determine the validity of releases of claims under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act. In holding that federal law governs, the
Court explained that "only if federal law controls can the federal Act
be given that uniform application throughout the country essential to
effectuate its purposes. ' 251 More recently, in Felder v. Casey,252 the
Court addressed whether a state court could enforce a state notice-ofclaim statute in a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In holding
that the state court could not enforce the statute, the Court explained
that "enforcement of such statutes in § 1983 actions brought in state
court will frequently and predictably produce different outcomes in
federal civil rights litigation based solely on whether that litigation
takes place in state or federal court. States may not apply such an
outcome-determinative law when entertaining substantive federal
rights in their courts."2 53 These kinds of cases are based on an
apparent constitutional presumption that a federal statute should
have the same meaning in the first instance whether enforced in a
state or a federal court. An interpretive methodology that enables a
state or federal court to make law for strategic, policy-based reasonsreasons that by their nature are not based on a metric that all other
state and federal judges could reasonably be expected to employ if
deciding the same case-would appear to be inconsistent with this
principle.
It is worth noting that there is also an apparent constitutional
presumption that state law should have the same meaning whether
enforced in a state or federal court. In the watershed case of Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,254 the Court held that "[e]xcept in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law
to be applied in any case is the law of the State."255 Today, the United
States Courts of Appeals uniformly interpret state statutes in the way
that they believe that the state's highest court would interpret the
same statute in the same context. For example, in KLC, Inc. v.
Trayner,256 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

342 U.S. 359 (1952).
Id. at 361.
487 U.S. 131 (1988).
Id. at 141.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Id. at 78.
426 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2005).
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recently explained that "[i]n determining the meaning of state law, we
must carefully predict how the state's highest court would rule if
confronted with the issue, including how it would resolve any
ambiguity in the statute."25 7 Every other circuit court appears to take
the same approach. 258 A premise of this approach is that state law
should have the same content in the same context as a rule of decision
in both state and federal courts.
If an inferior federal court were to self-consciously make new
federal law in strategic ways in interpreting federal law, it would deny
to the federal law so made the very supremacy that characterizes a
law as "federal" under the Constitution. Such law would not operate
upon its making as the "supreme Law of the Land." On this point, the
Supreme Court of course stands on different footing than inferior
federal courts that lack nationwide jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
has nationwide jurisdiction. When the Supreme Court declares
something to be the applicable federal rule of decision, it states a
federal law that it can purport to be the law that every state and
federal court should apply in the future in the same context. There
would be two problems or anomalies, however, with recognizing a

257. Id. at 175-76.
258. See United States v. Atiyeh, 402 F.3d 354, 369 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Because we are
interpreting a state statute, we must determine how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
rule if presented with this case."); Marvin Lumber and Cedar Co. v. PPG. Indus., 401 F.3d 901,
917 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he decision here, one interpreting the Minnesota statute, is reviewed de
novo. Because the Minnesota Supreme Court has not decided the issue before us, we must
predict how the state's highest court would rule if faced with the same question."); United States
v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 871 (10th Cir. 2005) ("This court is bound to interpret Kansas law as
would a Kansas Court .....Where no controlling state court decision exists, the federal court
must attempt to predict what the state's highest court would do.") (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); Bogosian v. Woloohojian Realty Corp., 323 F.3d 55, 71 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Absent
state-court case law on point, wherever practicable we undertake a fair prediction as to the
course the highest state court would take were it presented with the same legal issue."); Himmel
v. Ford Motor Co., 342 F.3d 593, 598 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Because the question at issue has not yet
been resolved by the Ohio courts, we must attempt to predict what the Ohio Supreme Court
would do if confronted with the same question."); Dyack v. N. Mariana Islands, 317 F.3d 1030,
1034 (9th Cir. 2003) ("In construing a state statute, we are bound by the pronouncements of the
state's highest court.... If the state's highest court has not addressed the issue, then we must
predict how that court would interpret the statute.") (citation omitted); Freeman v. First Union
Nat'l, 329 F.3d 1231, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003) ("We decide novel questions of state law the way it
appears the state's highest court would.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Wells
v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 527-28 (4th Cir. 1999) ("As a court sitting in diversity, we have an
obligation to interpret the law in accordance with the Court of Appeals of Maryland, or where the
law is unclear, as it appears that the Court of Appeals would rule."); Brownsburg Area Patrons
Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 137 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Federal courts must interpret a
state statute as that state's courts would construe it."); Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Elliott
Turbomachinery Co., 84 F.3d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Our interpretation of a state statute is
not accomplished with unfettered discretion. The federal court is bound to answer the question
the way the state's highest court would resolve the issue.").
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power in the Supreme Court to make new law in interpreting federal
statutes in ways that inferior federal courts or state courts may not.
First, the Supreme Court would appear to owe the same respect to the
federal lawmaking procedures that the Constitution specifies as state
courts and inferior federal courts owe them. If the existence of such
procedures operates as a limitation on the lawmaking authority of
state courts and inferior federal courts, it may operate as a limitation
on the lawmaking authority of the Supreme Court as well.
Second, if the Supreme Court has power to make federal law
that state courts and inferior federal courts lack, the Court must be
justified in applying a rule of decision that a state court or an inferior
federal court would not have been justified in applying in the first
instance. In other words, the Supreme Court must be justified in
reversing a state court or an inferior federal court for the "error" of not
applying a federal rule of decision that the state or inferior federal
court had no authority to apply in the first instance. The Supreme
Court has held that, in exercising its appellate jurisdiction, it may
apply different law than a lower court could have applied when
Congress has retroactively changed the law during the pendency of
litigation. 259 It has justified this practice, however, on the ground that
courts have a duty to "decide according to existing laws" no matter
what the stage of litigation is.26° This ground of decision-that all
courts must "decide according to existing laws"-seemingly contradicts
any claim that the Supreme Court is uniquely justified in dynamically
interpreting federal statutes to set new federal policy.
Again, none of this is to deny the reality that different courts
give different interpretations to the same statute in materially similar
contexts. The constitutional presumption that animates cases like
Dice, Felder, and Erie is that a state or federal court should strive, as
far as is possible, to interpret state or federal statutory law, at the
appropriate level of generality, as it exists relative to the governed
transaction, not as it should be going forward from the interpretive
decision. Though in fact different courts might give the same statute a
different meaning in the same context under this principle, they would
do so as a consequence of trying to implement statutory law as
Congress made it, not because it is proper for a court to self-

259. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 226 (1995).
260. See id. at 227 ("It is the obligation of the last court in the hierarchy that rules on the
case to give effect to Congress's latest enactment, even when that has the effect of overturning
the judgment of an inferior court, since each court, at every level, must 'decide according to
existing laws."' (quoting United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109 (1801)
(Marshall, J.))).
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consciously make a statute serve a policy going forward that the court
believes it should serve.
Indeed, legal philosophers have described the idea that
underlies anti-forum-shopping measures-essentially that courts
should treat like cases alike-as a fundamental principle of fairness
for any legal system. 261 As put by Chief Justice John Marshall in 1817
in a letter advocating that judicial decisions be reported, "[i]t is
certainly to be wished that independent tribunals having concurrent
jurisdiction over the same subject should concur in the principles on
which they determine the causes coming before them."262 If this notion
is correct, constitutional limitations on the way in which state courts
properly interpret federal statutes should inform our understandings
of the judicial power of federal courts in interpreting federal statutes.
Specifically, if the Constitution contemplates that state courts must
interpret federal statutes as faithful agents of Congress and that
federal and state courts must strive to interpret federal statutes in the
same manner, it would stand to reason that state courts and federal
courts should strive to interpret federal statutes in such a way as to
give effect to actual legislative directives.
CONCLUSION

The question of how courts ought to interpret federal statutes
implicates not only the horizontal relationship between the legislative
power of Congress and the judicial power of federal courts; it also
implicates the vertical relationship between the federal legislative
power and state judicial powers. In the first three decades following
261. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 165 (1986) (arguing that political morality
"requires government to speak with one voice, to act in a principled and coherent manner toward
all its citizens, to extend to everyone the substantive standards of justice or fairness it uses for
some"); NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 150 (1978) (describing it as a

"principle of justice in adjudication ... to treat like cases alike, and therefore to treat this case in
a way in which it will be justifiable to treat future like cases"); John Finnis, Natural Law: The
Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 55

(Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) ("[J]udges confronted by an issue not settled by the
plain meaning of a constitution or statute ought to try to settle it in the way that it would be
settled by any other judges hearing the case on the same day in the same realm."). Similarly,
Finnis points out that: "In the working of the legal process, much turns on the principle-a
principle of fairness-that litigants (and others involved in the process) should be treated by
judges (and others with power to decide) impartially, in the sense that they are as nearly as
possible to be treated by each judge as they would be treated by every other judge." John Finnis,
Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 134, 150

(Robert P. George ed., 1992).
262. Letter from Chief Justice John Marshall to Congress (Feb. 7, 1817), in 2 WILLIAM
WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

1246 (1953).
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ratification, state courts interpreted federal statutes in ways
understood to be geared toward implementing actual congressional
directives. If state courts interpreted their own statutes in certain
cases without apparent regard for actual legislative expectations, the
practice of state courts in interpreting federal statutes may well
evidence an understanding that state courts were bound to interpret
federal statutes according to manifest congressional expectations. This
understanding certainly accords with the import of the Supremacy
Clause: to ensure that state courts faithfully enforce as the "supreme
law of the Land" federal statutes that Congress has properly enacted.
This understanding may have implications for the interpretation of
federal statutes by federal courts. Specifically, it may suggest that to
respect the federal lawmaking procedures that the Constitution
provides and to safeguard the supremacy of federal law enacted
pursuant to those procedures, federal courts should strive to interpret
federal statutes as faithful agents of Congress as well.
This Article does not address whether, today, some form of
textualism or purposivism would better serve as a means of
implementing congressional directives in any given case. As explained,
there are examples of state courts in the decades following ratification
seeking to implement actual congressional intent through both textual
and purposive analyses. The point for now is that state courts,
employing various interpretive principles, appear to have understood
their role in interpreting federal statutes during the first three
decades of the Union to be to implement actual directives of Congress.

